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ABSTRACT 
Owning and operating airports is an expensive business.  For many local 
governments and private corporations involved, the business of airport 
management can be extremely lucrative when the facility and the operation are 
effectively and efficiently administered.  For the DoD, airport management is a 
huge expense.  During this time of historic budget reductions, one wonders 
whether the existing portfolio of military airfields can be sustained.  The U.S. Air 
Force portfolio of airfields currently in place in the European theater is the focus 
of this research project because the United States has an extensive and long-
standing inventory of airfields there.  Ultimately, this thesis asks whether 
significant strategic and political changes necessitate a different approach to U.S. 
military airport management in Europe.  The U.S. Air Force should stay in 
Europe, but it should convert some of its heavy, main operating bases to more 
flexible, “lighter” installations for both economic and strategic reasons. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Owning and operating airports is an expensive business.  For many local 
governments and private corporations involved, the business of airport 
management can be extremely lucrative when the facility and the operation are 
effectively and efficiently administered.  For the DoD, airport management is a 
huge expense.  Building an airfield operating environment of interconnected 
runways, taxiways, and parking aprons comes at an enormous cost.  
Constructing maintenance hangars, cargo loading areas and passenger 
terminals produce a higher price tag.  Providing critical safety and security 
functions from air traffic control services to weather support to perimeter and 
airport surveillance adds even more overhead to the bill.  For stand-alone military 
airfields within the United States, all of these infrastructure and support function 
expenses are absorbed by the DoD.  Such operating and maintenance costs 
associated with military airfields from which U.S. forces operate in overseas 
locations are typically shared between the United States government and the 
host nation. 
This thesis investigates whether the DoD can continue to afford and 
sustain its existing portfolio of military airfields, especially in these days of 
increasingly constrained budgets.  The U.S. Air Force portfolio of airfields 
currently in place in the European theater is the focus of this research project 
because the United States has an extensive and long-standing inventory of 
airfields there.  Ultimately, this thesis asks whether significant strategic and 
political changes necessitate a different approach to U.S. military airport 
management in Europe. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Who pays for what in regard to the U.S. portfolio of overseas military 
installations? C.T. Sandars, a civil servant in the British Ministry of Defense, 
 2
emphasizes in his book America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire, 
that the financial arrangements associated with the U.S. network of military 
installations varies from country to country.1  It is the “wide variety of 
arrangements with differing political and financial features” that Sandars dubs the 
American “leasehold empire.”2  Sandars draws a distinct contrast between the 
American network of military installations and the pre-war colonial empires of 
Great Britain, France, and Russia.  The colonial empires of Great Britain, France, 
and Russia were sustained by the forward presence of their respective militaries 
on territories that had been claimed by their respective governments.  The 
“leasehold empire” of the United States maintained a global, forward presence by 
negotiating basing rights and financial agreements with host nations around the 
world. 
 The global network of U.S. military installations certainly includes a 
number of bases residing in U.S. territories.  For example, Puerto Rico, a U.S. 
territory since 1898, has hosted installations of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air 
Force during different periods of its history as a U.S. territory.3  Guam, a U.S. 
territory since 1950, continues to host thousands of U.S. Navy and Air Force 
personnel through active installations on the island.  Furthermore, Guam is 
preparing to host an additional 8,000 to 9,000 U.S. Marines projected to relocate 
to the Pacific island from Okinawa by 2014.4  While these territorial installations 
assist in providing a global forward presence, the U.S. foots the entire bill for 
these facilities because no host nation exists with which to split the costs. 
 In his book Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American 
Globalism, Kent E. Calder, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, provides a 
                                            
1 C.T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
2 Ibid., 15. 
3 “Puerto Rico—US Military Facilities,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified May 07, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/puerto-rico.htm. 
4 Catherine Lutz, “American Military Bases on Guam: The US Global Military Basing 
System,” Global Research, August 2, 2010, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20405. 
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detailed analysis of the burden sharing or “Host-Nation Support” supplied by 
various countries around the globe.5  Based on the particular arrangements 
between the host nation and the United States, Calder divides host nations into 
two groups: 
 Affluent, but once-occupied nations—Japan, Germany, and South 
Korea 
 Developing nations—Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
With the first group, costs are shared between the United States and the host 
nation.  However, the level of “Host-Nation Support” varies greatly among these 
nations, which likely reflects the variety of “leasehold” agreements identified by 
Sandars.  The second group reflects what Calder considers to be far more 
common cases.6  Within the developing nations around the globe, the United 
States tends to pay the host nation for basing rights. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sparked a huge increase in U.S. 
military installations across Central Asia, with the vast majority of these 
installations being established in developing nations, the group of nations in 
which the United States pays for access and basing rights.  This trend is likely to 
continue as the United States postures its military forces to confront the dynamic 
twenty-first–century security environment.  Calder points out: “Above all, we have 
continually seen the fragile, embattled standing of America’s troops abroad in the 
domestic politics of most host nations, and their deepening reliance on money—
America’s own or that of allies—to stabilize their presence.”7  As the United 
States continues to struggle with its own economic woes, alternatives to this 
trend of reliance on money to stabilize a forward U.S. military presence must be 
considered. 
                                            
5 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 206–208. 
6 Ibid., 200. 
7 Ibid., 208. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The DoD is facing some of the most difficult times in terms of financial 
constraints in over a generation.  Just before retiring earlier this year, then-
Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained to lawmakers that the expected 
$400 billion in DoD cuts will produce a smaller military.8  The Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, General Norton Schwartz, recently voiced a similar sentiment for the 
Air Force.  The front page of the Air Force Times published on December 19, 
2011, announced: “We are going to get smaller.”9 “Getting smaller” here seems 
to mean going to fewer places and doing fewer things, even as senior defense 
leaders insist that the cuts will affect absolute numbers but not quality of the 
force. Nearly everything is up for review, including the efficacy of maintaining so 
much infrastructure, including airfields, in Europe. 
1. Future Security Environment 
Predicting the future security environment is a central debate of numerous 
strategic and political discussions.  Will there be a twenty-first–century peer 
competitor to the United States? Will rogue nations continue to present a threat 
requiring containment, deterrence or direct action?  Will extremists and terror 
networks continue to thrive in the Information Age?  Will humanitarian relief 
missions remain a key component of global military actions?  This thesis does 
not attempt to answer all of these questions in detail.  However, the strategies 
adopted by successive presidential administrations and military leaders reflect 
how the United States will be postured, in terms of force structure and base 
structure, for the future security environment.  Therefore, review and analysis of 
the National Security Strategy and related military strategies will be key 
documents in the further development of this thesis.  Additionally, the 
                                            
8 Leo Shane III, “Gates: DOD budget cuts will require rethinking missions, benefits,” Stars 
and Stripes, June 15, 2011, accessed December 16, 2011, http://www.stripes.com/gates-dod-
budget-cuts-will-require-rethinking-missions-benefits-1.146688. 
9 General Norton Schwartz, interview by Vago Muradian, “’Readiness is a prime imperative’: 
Schwartz talks Dover, budgets and a smaller Air Force with less depth and fewer capabilities,” Air 
Force Times, December 19, 2011, 18–20. 
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congressional testimony of U.S. European Command’s combatant commander 
and respective posture statements will provide additional insights into how the 
United States is positioned to deal with security threats across the European 
theater. 
2. Why Does the U.S. Military Remain Heavily Invested in 
Europe? 
Every spring, the U.S. Combatant Commanders travel to the nation’s 
capital to provide Congress with the current “posture” of their respective 
commands.  A large part of this effort includes testimony provided by the 
Combatant Commanders to both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
House Armed Services Committee.  During the annual hearing of the 
Commander of U.S. European Command before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on March 29, 2011, Senator Joe Lieberman asked, “What the heck 
are we still doing in Europe?”10   
Senator Lieberman’s question was preceded by comments concerning the 
intense financial strain facing the nation and the Department of Defense, and the 
suggestions by some government officials to reduce our military footprint in 
Europe because World War II and the Cold War were won decades ago.  Admiral 
James G. Stavridis, the current Commander of U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM), answered Senator Lieberman’s question by first explaining the 
significant reduction in U.S. military presence across Europe since the end of the 
Cold War.  Admiral Stavridis estimated the United States has experienced a 
75-percent reduction in its forward European presence over the past twenty 
years.  The “big, muscular operation” of the U.S. military’s European presence 
during the Cold War included approximately 400,000 troops and 1,200 bases and 
sites.  Today, EUCOM is made up of 80,000 troops operating from about twelve 
                                            
10 U.S. European Command Posture Statement of 2011, Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) video accessed October 16, 2011 (statement by Senator Joseph 
Lieberman) http://www.eucom.mil/english/Posture-Statement.asp. 
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main operating bases and many other additional sites across Europe.11  Despite 
this significant reduction in EUCOM’s force structure, Admiral Stavridis explained 
the U.S. military’s forward presence in Europe remains extremely valuable for: 
 Reassuring allies 
 Deterrence 
 Conducting military operations 
 Training and building partnership capacity12 
Still, Admiral Stavridis said that EUCOM planners were analyzing additional U.S. 
force reductions in Europe, and that he was “comfortable” with taking “a little bit 
more” from the existing U.S. forward military presence in Europe. 
This thesis will argue for an alternative approach.  While getting smaller 
may be inevitable due to the looming budget reductions, going to fewer places 
and doing fewer things may not.  Adjustments to the current U.S. overseas 
military presence actually may allow the United States to go to more places and 
do more things for more efficiently spent sums.  In 1990, James R. Blaker, a 
senior executive with the DoD, recognized a “basing paradox” pertaining to the 
U.S. overseas base structure: “a shrinking overseas basing system that costs 
more each year.”13  Such calculus seems at first blush to militate for rolling up 
U.S. bases overseas.  But such experts as Calder actually argue for “more and 
‘lighter’ bases, with many distributed across remote, sparsely governed parts of 
the developing world.”14  This research project examines this claim and finds that 
it is possible to increase the number of U.S. Air Force airfields in Europe, while 
simultaneously saving money and improving strategic effectiveness. 
                                            
11 U.S. European Command Posture Statement of 2011, Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) video accessed October 16, 2011 (statement by Admiral James 
G. Stavridis) http://www.eucom.mil/english/Posture-Statement.asp. 
12 Ibid. 
13 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (New 
York: Praeger, 1990), 125. 
14 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 33. 
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3. Unknown Influence of Technology 
Technology likely will play a significant role in shaping the twenty-first–
century security environment. Technological advancements in aviation constantly 
forced governments and militaries to rethink strategy throughout the twentieth 
century.  In a matter of four to five decades, the size of military airfields grew 
from ten-acre parcels of land to several thousand acres of land required to 
support high-performance jet aircraft. Technological advancements in aviation 
are likely to continue.  The use of unmanned aerial vehicles or remotely piloted 
aircraft, of all shapes and sizes, undoubtedly will continue to increase across all 
four U.S. military services.  Tiltrotor aircraft, like the V-22 Osprey, are capable of 
flying as a helicopter and an airplane.  Perhaps technological advancements in 
aviation will reverse the trend of expansive, thousand-acre airfields, and future 
aircraft will enable the U.S. military to return to airfields the size of most 
backyards or helipads.  Or, the range of aircraft will enable an increasing number 
of missions to launch and depart from the United States, eliminating the need for 
overseas airfields. 
The topic of technology’s influence on the future security environment and 
subsequent influence on military installations of tomorrow is far too large to tackle 
in this particular thesis.  Recent technological advances in computers and 
communications enable the military services of today to reduce the footprint of 
forward deployed forces.  For example, unmanned aerial vehicles flying over the 
skies of Iraq and Afghanistan not only replace the pilot in the cockpit, but these 
vehicles are also controlled from sensor operators located thousands of miles 
away within the United States.  Despite these technological advances, an 
assumption is made that the United States will continue to rely on a network of 
airfields to project military power across the globe. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In October of 2008, EUCOM requested a study of Stuttgart Army Airfield.  
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) maintained a small presence at the base with an 
Aviation Company as the leading command echelon.  Through late 2007 and 
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most of 2008, airlift requirements operating to and from Stuttgart Army Airfield 
surged in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the creation of U.S. 
Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the placement of AFRICOM headquarters in 
the Stuttgart area.  The U.S. Army’s intrinsic capabilities assigned to Stuttgart 
Army Airfield were quickly overwhelmed.  The study group, in which I 
participated, discovered USAREUR shared the airfield with German civilians who 
operated Stuttgart International Airport, Germany’s seventh-busiest airport, on 
the other side of the field.  In this modern commercial airport with plans for further 
expansion and growth, German companies maintained tremendous capability to 
support airlift and aircraft operations across the airfield.  U.S. military officials in 
Europe had yet to explore the potential partnership opportunities with German 
civilians and companies to support the dramatic increase in operations at 
Stuttgart Army Airfield. 
The research conducted during the study of Stuttgart Army Airfield led to 
speculation about similar happenings at other U.S. military airfields across 
Europe.  Such “spit-balling” led to this research project and studying all USAFE 
airfields in the European AOR.  In this time of diminishing financial resources, 
were opportunities for greater partnership and cooperation at USAFE airfields 
going unnoticed and unexplored? 
Little has been written with the precise focus of U.S. military airfields.  A 
group of historians and officials from the Air Force Historical Research Agency, 
led by editor Frederick J. Shaw, organized a detailed history of U.S. Air Force 
installations.  In 2004, they published their findings in the book Locating Air Force 
Base Sites: History’s Legacy.15  Shaw’s group provided the most extensive 
research pertaining to Air Force airfields conducted to date.  While History’s 
                                            
15 Frederick J. Shaw, ed. Locating Air Force Base Sites: History’s Legacy, Air Force History 
and Museums Program, United States Air Force, Washington D.C., 2004.  It is important to note 
Shaw’s group does not distinguish between an Air Force installation and an Air Force airfield.  
While many installations include an airfield, not all do.  Therefore, the two terms are not 
completely interchangeable.  Many of the studies (Calder, Sandars and Blaker) reviewed during 
the research for this project looked at overseas military installations in their entirety.  This 
research project will investigate a subset of military installations, Air Force airfields. 
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Legacy was limited to the study of domestic USAF airfields, the findings of 
Shaw’s group definitely has relevance to this research project. 
On the other hand, numerous volumes have been written on the global 
basing system of U.S. military installations generally.  Blaker, Sandars, and 
Calder each published studies with different perspectives on the U.S. overseas 
basing structure.  Despite the lack of emphasis specifically on airfields, their post-
Cold War studies on U.S. military installations around the globe do have 
significant application to this concentrated thesis on USAFE airfields.  Of the 
three, Calder’s Embattled Garrisons, published in 2007, is the most pertinent 
since it emphasizes the challenges with maintaining a global basing structure in 
the post-9/11 era.  In this most unpredictable era, overseas bases are increasing 
difficult to sustain politically,16 and financially (with rising costs and shrinking 
budgets). 
1. Figuring the Costs Associated with Overseas Military Airfields 
Exactly how much does the U.S. pay for basing rights in order to maintain 
its global network of U.S. military installations?  This question is extremely 
difficult to answer.  The total can be partially estimated by calculating the foreign 
aid and foreign military sales a nation receives from the United States.  Yet these 
figures alone are likely far from precise amounts.  Calder argues that, “the overall 
packages that host nations receive, and their relationship to the details of basing 
arrangements themselves, generally remain both classified and largely insulated 
from public scrutiny.”17   Therefore, this project will not attempt to answer this 
particular question.  An assumption will be made that the costs associated with 
maintaining a global network of Air Force airfields is significant enough for it to be 
included in the DoD and Air Force’s search for potential savings. 
 Following Calder’s study, it becomes evident the costs associated with 
maintaining a global U.S. military presence are rising.  Host-Nation Support does 
                                            
16 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 2. 
17 Ibid., 200. 
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not offset the costs by much.  Calder emphasizes: “Nowhere … does a host 
nation pay the salaries of American forces overseas.  And rarely does it pay their 
operational costs.”18  These operational costs are estimated to absorb 20 percent 
of the DoD’s annual budget.19  Perhaps, then, the operational costs of 
maintaining a forward overseas presence should be targeted for savings?  The 
average annual DoD budget for FY 2012 through FY 2016 is estimated to be 
nearly $584 billion.20  One-fifth of this amount is $116.8 billion.  Reducing these 
operational costs associated with maintaining overseas bases by just 1 percent 
produces more than $1 billion savings. 
Almost two decades ahead of Calder, Blaker recognized similar difficulties 
in pinpointing the exact costs involved with the overseas basing network.  
Additionally, he identified the rising costs associated with maintaining the U.S. 
forward military presence.  Blaker defined two types of costs relating to the 
overseas basing network, fixed costs and permission costs.  His analysis 
suggested that fixed costs, primarily maintenance and operating costs, remained 
fairly static over the thirty-year period studied (1960–1990).  He estimated the 
U.S. paid approximately $5 billion a year in fixed costs during this period.21  On 
the other hand, permission costs are payments by the U.S. that buy the privilege 
of basing rights within a host nation.  Blaker discovered permission costs were 
consistently on the rise during the same thirty-year period. 
However one defines the costs associated with the U.S. overseas basing 
network, researchers seem to agree the total costs have been steadily rising.  
This rise in costs occurred despite a gradual decrease in the overall number of 
military installations abroad, Blaker’s aforementioned “basing paradox.”  A higher 
cost for lesser facilities certainly is an alarming trend.  Blaker wrote: “The notion 
                                            
18 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 190. 
19 Ibid., 214. 
20 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, “United States Department 
of Defense Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request,” February 2011, accessed December 16, 2011, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf,  
1-2. 
21 Blaker, Anatomy of the Dilemma, 104. 
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that the presence or absence of U.S. military bases is essentially a question of 
money will ultimately shift the question of how much basing is enough away from 
strategy and toward the bottom line of monetary costs.”22  The United States 
cannot afford, strategically, to find itself in this position. 
2. History of Domestic Air Force Airfields 
A small drill field at Fort Myer, Virginia, became the U.S. Army Signal 
Corps’ first airfield from 1908–1909, allowing the Wright Brothers to conduct flight 
trials of their “heavier-than-air flying machine.”23  The first forty years of military 
air power experienced a continuous “ebb and flow of base openings and 
closings.”24  World War I witnessed the network of military airfields grow to 105 
installations,25 only to have the Army Air Service’s collection of airfields diminish 
to just twenty-six airfields by 1923.26  Two decades later, the number of military 
airfields owned and operated by the Army Air Forces27 swelled to more than 
400.28  Again, such growth did not last.  A strategy of divestment and draw-down 
began well before victory was assured in Europe or the Pacific.  By the time the 
                                            
22 Blaker, Anatomy of the Dilemma, 113. 
23 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 8. 
24 Ibid., 5. 
25 Ibid., 12. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Before the establishment of an independent Air Force, the Army’s aviation assets were 
organized within an evolving organizational structure.  In 1907, an Aeronautical Division was 
established within the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps, and initial responsibilities of developing an air 
arm fell to the Signal Corps.  A decade later, the Army Air Service was created raising its 
standing from a division within the Signal Corps to a combatant arm of the line along with the 
Infantry, Cavalry, Signal Corps, and others.  Aviation leaders, led by the controversial General 
Billy Mitchell, continued to fight for the creation of an independent air force separate from the 
Army and Navy.  However, the transition to an independent air arm would be slow.  Established in 
1926, the Army Air Corps expanded and modernized the fleet of military aircraft over the next 15 
years.  The final precursor of an independent Air Force was the U.S. Army Air Forces, created in 
1941 to better manage the quickly expanding force as the U.S. headed into World War II.   
Finally, the U.S. Air Force was established on September 18, 1947 with the signing of the 
National Security Act of 1947. 
28 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 41. 
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Air Force was established as a separate service in September 1947, it inherited 
an inventory of 115 major installations.29 
During the 1950s, the Air Force experienced significant growth.  The 
advancing Soviet threat drove the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to 
push the long-range bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities of 
the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the forefront of DoD priorities.  
Primarily built on the “temporary” installations of World War II, the Air Force 
inventory of installations peaked at 162 in 1956.30  However, this era represented 
the last time the Air Force established new, domestic Air Force Bases as eight 
new installations were built between 1950 and 1959.31 
The 1960s ushered in a new era for Air Force installations as the Kennedy 
Administration introduced an important shift in U.S. national defense strategy—
from one of “massive retaliation” to one of “flexible response.”32 This strategic 
shift pushed the Air Force tactical and airlift forces up the ladder of defense 
priorities as conventional forces would be tasked to respond to “conflicts and 
                                            
29 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 47. 
30 Ibid., 89. 
31 Ibid., 56. 
32 Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., Chief, Historical Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe, NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, accessed December 26, 2011, XIX–XXV, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf.  “Massive Retailiation” refers to the strategy 
employed by NATO and established by MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of 
the NATO Area,” on May 23, 1957.  With MC 14/2, NATO’s nuclear arsenal was instituted as the 
focus of the Alliance’s deterrence strategy.  NATO marched forward to “ensure the ability to carry 
out an instant and devastating nuclear counteroffensive by all means available.”  Technological 
developments associated with nuclear strike capabilities altered the playing field from 1957 to 
1962.  The advent of long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles drove NATO 
leaders to rethink their strategy of “massive retaliation.”  A second crisis in Berlin from 1958 to 
1962 and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were both resolved with non-nuclear responses.  U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara advanced the concept of “flexible response,” providing 
options of limited war before all-out nuclear war, at a North Atlantic Council meeting in December 
1961.  Changes to NATO’s strategy stalled in the mid-1960s as the Johnson Administration was 
increasingly focused on events in Vietnam, and partly due to France’s opposition to changing the 
strategy from “massive retaliation.”  After France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
command structure in March 1966, the Alliance advanced toward officially changing the strategy 
to “flexible response.”  Ultimately, this strategy shift was achieved with the approval of a new 
“Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area,” MC 14/3, on 16 January 1968. 
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insurgencies around the world.”33  While Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift 
Command grew, Strategic Air Command’s prominence faded. 
Shaw’s group identified the period from 1961 to 1987 as a period of 
“retrenchment, consolidation, and stabilization.”34  The retrenchment of 
installations and airfields was an obvious consequence of organizational 
reductions and subsequent personnel reductions.  Organizationally, the Air Force 
experienced a reduction from 193 wings in 1962 to 150 by 1987.35  Personnel 
reductions experienced a similar trend during the same period.  For example, the 
Air Force employed 52,000 pilots in 1961.  However, by 1980 this figure was cut 
in half to less than 26,000 pilots.36  Consolidation was encountered as many 
installations began to develop as “multi-mission” bases.37  As missions changed 
and adjusted based on the shift in strategy to “flexible response” and 
technological advances, many installations transferred hands from one command 
to another.  Jurisdiction among commands surfaced as an issue at Air Force 
installations.38  However, these early consolidations leading to multi-mission 
bases likely saved many installations from closure by the Base Closure and 
Realignment Commissions of the past twenty-five years. 
Finally, stabilization became a characteristic of this era as Congressional 
politics became more and more influential in making changes to DoD’s inventory 
of CONUS installations.  During the 1960s, base closure decisions were 
announced and executed within a matter of a few months as the DoD, led by 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, pushed for greater “efficiency and 
cutting waste in the defense establishment.”39  The process of closing DoD 
installations underwent a significant shift in the 1970s and 1980s as “Congress 
                                            
33 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 103. 
34 Ibid., 105. 
35 Ibid., 103. 
36 Ibid., 129. 
37 Ibid., 105. 
38 Ibid., 126. 
39 Ibid., 101. 
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mandated that the Department of Defense (DoD) comply with the requirements 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 before closings could 
occur.”40  Over the years, Shaw’s group identifies the involvement of numerous 
politicians (from Congressmen to Senators to a campaign promise by then 
Presidential-Candidate Ronald Reagan in 1980) in base closure proceedings.  
Yet, they credit the “congressionally mandated application of NEPA” with having 
the greatest influence in the process during this era of “retrenchment, 
consolidation and stabilization.”41  In 1987, the Air Force maintained and 
operated 104 major installations.42 
For Air Force installations, the post-Cold War era can be summed up by 
one four-letter acronym, BRAC.  The DoD has conducted five rounds of Base 
Closure and Realignment Commissions, or BRAC, since 1988.  BRAC was 
created to somewhat overcome the legislative paralysis that developed during 
the 1970s and 1980s concerning base closures and political interference.  The 
1988 BRAC Report identifies this struggle in the following terms: 
 
For over a decade, the Department of Defense has been unable to 
improve the effectiveness of the military base structure to realize 
the significant savings that might have been gained through the 
realignment and closure of unnecessary or underutilized military 
bases. This situation is largely the result of 1977 legislation that 
mandated Congressional approval for any closure affecting 300 or 
more civilian employees of the Department. In this same legislation, 
the Department was expressly directed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
for all base closure decisions.43 
 
The success of the 1988 BRAC and a rapidly changing security 
environment helped to produce Public Law 101-510, the Defense Base Closure 
                                            
40 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 101. 
41 Ibid., 133. 
42 Ibid., 139. 
43 Department of Defense, Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignment and 
Closure, December 29, 1988, accessed November 21, 2011, 6, 
http://www.defense.gov/brac/docs/1988.pdf. 
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and Realignment Act of 1990.  Subsequently, Public Law 101-510 resulted in 
three more rounds of BRAC, 1991, 1993, and 1995.44  With the Soviet threat 
gone, the Air Force underwent drastic reductions in its size and budget.  Shaw’s 
group identified a 30-percent budget cut from 1990 to 1995 alone.45  The first 
four rounds of BRAC enabled the Air Force to address the massive post-Cold 
War cuts in personnel, aircraft and resources by closing and realigning more than 
thirty installations.  Ultimately, the number of domestic Air Force installations had 
declined to sixty-nine by 2003.46 
 After a ten-year hiatus, BRAC returned in 2005 as then Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld focused the DoD on transformation.  This latest round 
was by far the largest to date as the “2005 BRAC recommendations exceeded 
the number considered by all prior BRAC Commissions combined.”47  The Air 
Force proposed numerous realignments and closures to the 2005 BRAC as it 
pursued a strategy “to increase effectiveness and reduce excess infrastructure 
and capacity by realigning and right sizing operational and support units.”48  
However, only two of the major closures proposed by the Air Force were active 
duty installations, Ellsworth and Cannon Air Force Bases.  The 2005 BRAC 
rejected the Air Force recommendations to close Ellsworth and Cannon, and 
both bases remain operational installations today. 
 After studying nearly 100 years of Air Force installation establishment and 
disestablishment, Shaw’s group concluded that “the decisive factor in 
determining the location and continuation of an Air Force installation has been its 
                                            
44 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-510, Sec. 2902, (as 
amended through the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003) accessed 
November 22, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/brac/docs/legis03.pdf. 
45 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 186. 
46 Ibid., 203. 
47 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Final Report to the President, Vol 
1, “Executive Summary,” accessed November 22, 2011, 
http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
48 Department of Defense, Report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations: BRAC 2005, Vol V, 
Part 1 of 2, May 2005, 1, accessed November 22, 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/VAirForce-o.pdf. 
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suitability for its military mission.”49  “History’s legacy” is another finding identified 
by this group of historians, as sixty-five of the sixty-nine active, domestic Air 
Force installations in 2003 had been active installations during World War II.50  
The two tenets of “history’s legacy” are: 
 Money follows the path of prior investment. 
 Criteria used for selecting a location for an air base have 
been remarkably stable.51 
For the purposes of this thesis, the second tenet is assumed to be true.  It is the 
first tenet of “history’s legacy” that is explored in reference to U.S. Air Force 
airfields in Europe.  Shaw’s group argues the decisive factor in maintaining an air 
base is its suitability to its military mission.  Yet, historical evidence reflects 
money certainly follows the path of prior investment as numerous U.S. airfields 
within the United States and in Europe have undergone significant mission 
changes over the years. 
 Another recommendation produced by the 2005 Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission was the joint basing program.  Under this 
recommendation, twelve joint bases were established from twenty-six separate 
installations.  Nine of the twelve joint bases established united a major Air Force 
airfield with the military installations in close proximity to the airfield.52  With full 
operational capability achieved at each of the twelve joint bases in 2010, DoD 
officials expect to see efficiencies produced from this experience of consolidating 
and streamlining installation support processes this year.  The lessons learned 
from the joint basing program within the United States and its territories will 
certainly generate considerations for more effective and efficient management of 
                                            
49 Shaw, History’s Legacy, 204. 
50 Ibid., 203. 
51 Ibid.  The criterion for airfield selection primarily refers to flat parcels of land with the ability 
to align runways in the direction of the prevailing wind. 
52 “Basing Directorate,” Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), last modified November 12, 2010, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/jointbasing_update.shtml. 
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USAFE’s airfield portfolio.  At a minimum, initiatives to consolidate and 
streamline airfield infrastructure and support facilities with joint and international 
partners in close proximity to USAFE airfields should be accepted. 
3. Overseas Airfields 
This research project will analyze the existing U.S. Air Force airfield 
portfolio within the U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility (AOR).53  A 
detailed study of each identified Air Force airfield will assist in determining if 
“history’s legacy” (as defined by Shaw’s group) shapes the airfield portfolio of the 
European theater.  Additionally, the 1988 BRAC Commission outlined the 
relationships between base structure, force structure and strategy when they 
stated, “The base structure should properly be derived from the force structure, 
which in turn should reflect national security strategy.”54  Therefore, examination 
of the force structures and security strategies implemented and pertaining to the 
U.S. forward military presence in Europe will be essential for understanding the 
network of airfields within this region. 
 Calder recognizes the vital importance of overseas bases from both a 
tactical military function and a strategic geopolitical function.  However, he 
questions how much longer the United States will be able to maintain its current 
network of foreign bases.  Calder states, “Other great powers, such as Russia, 
Britain, and France, have already, by and large, lost their global basing networks, 
under a range of economic and political pressures.”55  As previously mentioned 
                                            
53 “Unified Command Plan,” Department of Defense, last modified October 28, 2011, 
http://www.defense.gov/ucc/.  The Unified Command Plan 2011 outlines the “missions, 
responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility” for the nine U.S. combatant commands.  
Three of the combatant commands are considered functional commands: Special Operations 
Command, Strategic Command and Transportation Command.  These functional commands will 
not be studied as part of this research project since the vast majority of military installations and 
forces are aligned under the regional combatant commands of which they reside.  The six 
regional combatant commands include European Command, Pacific Command, Southern 
Command, Central Command, Northern Command and Africa Command.  The entire globe is 
divided into six areas of responsibility delegated to these six regional commands. 
54 Department of Defense, Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignment and 
Closure, 30. 
55 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 1. 
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in this chapter, the economic pressures on the Department of Defense, to include 
its global basing network, are certainly increasing. 
 Calder describes a historical influence similar to the Shaw group’s 
“history’s legacy.”  While Shaw’s group focused on airfields, Calder studied all 
military installations.  And while Shaw’s group recognized the substantial 
influence of World War II on the domestic Air Force installations of 2003, Calder 
recognized an imperial influence, both British and American, on the U.S. global 
basing network dating back to the nineteenth century.56  Calder states, “It is far 
easier to change functions at existing bases than to move bases themselves.”57  
Again, “history’s legacy” on the overseas airfields of the U.S. Air Force will be 
studied in this research project. 
 Embattled Garrisons spends many pages and multiple chapters on the 
impact “base politics” has on military installations around the world.  For Calder, 
base politics is extremely influential in determining the stability and future 
success of overseas military installations.  Amid the global struggle against 
terrorism, Calder argues a global basing structure heavily invested in the 
developing regions of the world (Asia, Africa and Latin America)58 will push “base 
politics” to the vanguard of strategic concerns for maintaining an American 
presence. 
 Similar to Calder’s Embattled Garrisons and the Shaw group’s study of 
domestic airfields, Sandars discovers “history’s legacy” holds true as the vast 
majority of military installations held by the U.S. can trace their roots back to 
World War II.  What Sandars unveils with historical precision is the deliberate, 
global posturing employed by the U.S. before entering and during the war.  One 
example of such posturing was the 99-year leases signed in March 1941 for 
American bases to be established on eight islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean.  
                                            
56 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 10–13. 
57 Ibid., 35. 
58 Ibid., 254. 
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The Roosevelt Administration acquired these basing rights on British colonial 
possessions in exchange for fifty obsolete naval destroyers.59 
Sandars’ in-depth review of how American military installations were 
transformed from “conquest to containment” in the European theater should 
prove to be a tremendous resource for this study.  Sandars credits the United 
States and its “leasehold empire” as being “remarkably successful in retaining 
access to the bases she needed.”60  Additionally, it is difficult to argue against 
the success of the American global network of military installations, established 
during World War II and eventually winning the Cold War.61 
Yet, consider for a moment Calder’s thesis regarding the global struggle 
against terrorism requiring possibly a new approach to military installation 
management within the “arc of instability.”  How the United States transforms its 
existing network of military installations to meet the demands of this twenty-first–
century struggle could prove to be paramount. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
C.T. Sandars arranged the majority his research in America’s Overseas 
Garrisons by different regions around the world: Asia, Europe, Mediterranean, 
and the Middle East.  This research project will take a similar approach to a 
focused review of the network of U.S. Air Force airfields within the European 
theater.  While Europe is just one of six regional areas of responsibility 
established by the Unified Command Plan, its significance to the U.S. forward 
military presence within Europe and around the globe is massive. 
The EUCOM AOR encompasses fifty-one countries—all the nations of 
Europe and Israel.  Its water space includes large portions of the Atlantic and 
                                            
59 Sandars, Leasehold Empire, 3. 
60 Ibid., 327. 
61 The author is not suggesting here that the American global network of military installations 
was the decisive factor in winning the Cold War.  However, when partnered with the policies of 
multiple Presidential administrations and an evolving strategy to contain communism and halt 
Soviet expansion, this global network certainly played a role as a key enabler of U.S. policies and 
military strategies. 
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Arctic Oceans, and the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, and Caspian Sea.  Overall, 
the EUCOM AOR comprises a population near 1 billion people, 10.7 million 
square miles of land, and 13 million square miles of ocean.62  Figure 1 provides a 
map of the EUCOM AOR, colored in blue. 
 
 
Figure 1.   EUCOM Area of Responsibility (From Google, 2011)63 
Why Europe?  European Command was selected as the focus of this 
research topic since it was one of the original regional combatant command’s 
established in 1947.  Due to its longer history and maturity as a regional 
command, a plethora of resources pertinent to this study were available for 
analysis.  For nearly forty years, Europe served as the frontlines of the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  How the network of U.S. Air 
Force airfields within Europe has adjusted and evolved over the years will likely 
                                            
62 U.S. European Command, Directorate of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. European 
Command,” accessed October 16, 2011, http://www.eucom.mil/doc/22822/u-s-european-
command.pdf. 
63 “EUCOM Regional Map,” Google, accessed December 12, 2011, 
http://www.google.com/search?q=EUCOM+regional+map.  
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provide vital lessons learned for other regions adjusting to an evolving 
environment, changing strategies and developing political structures.  Of course, 
similar studies focused on the areas of responsibility of the other regional 
combatant commands is encouraged and recommended. 
To ensure a narrower scope for this project a decision was made to limit 
its focus to U.S. Air Force airfields.  While regional combatant commands include 
components of all four military services, this thesis will only study the airfield 
portfolios of the Air Force component within Europe.  The 2010 Base Structure 
Report and other documents will be used to identify the U.S. Air Force airfields 
across Europe.  Every attempt will be made to include all Air Force airfields that 
have a permanent presence, either personnel or aircraft, stationed at the airfield.  
This project is not intended to be a debate about which installations and facilities 
are or are not included as part of the “American Empire” of military installations 
around the globe. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remaining chapters will analyze USAFE’s airfield portfolio utilizing a 
commonly used framework for categorizing military installations: Main Operating 
Bases (MOB), Forward-Operating Sites (FOS), Cooperative-Security Locations 
(CSL), Joint Pre-position Sites (JPS) and En Route Infrastructure (ERI). Adam J. 
Hebert, a senior editor with Air Force Magazine, wrote the DoD established this 
framework in 2004 when it initiated a review of the Department’s global 
posture.64  Calder credits the development of this framework to General James 
Jones, the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and former 
National Security Advisor to President Obama.65  On March 24, 2004, General 
                                            
64 Adam J. Hebert, “Presence, Not Permanence,” airforce-magazine.com, August 2006, Vol. 
89, No. 8, accessed November 25, 2011, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2006/August%202006/0806presence.aspx. 
65 “National Security Advisor: General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret),” White House, 
accessed November 11, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/nsa/.  General 
Jones was SACEUR and Commander of EUCOM from January 2003 to December 2006.  Since 
retiring from military service in February 2007, General Jones has continued his government 
service as a civilian in a number of politically appointed positions, including National Security 
Advisor to the President where he has served from January 2009 to October 2010. 
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Jones, then-SACEUR, outlined this framework during his testimony to the House 
Armed Services Committee.66  The framework effectively organizes military 
installations, including airfields, in different sizes relating to organizations 
assigned and support infrastructure established.  The operational costs 
associated with the different categories of airfields will be largely estimated 
based on the size of the organization and personnel assigned.67 
 The portfolio of airfields identified in the following chapters is not intended 
to be all-inclusive; the airfields named are not the only airfields in Europe from 
which USAFE units operate.  USAFE units frequently operate from airfields not 
named in this report for contingency operations, exercises, and other training 
opportunities.  The permanent68 presence of USAFE personnel, aircraft or 
materiel was established as a necessary characteristic for an airfield to be 
considered part of the USAFE portfolio. 
Chapter II: Main Operating Bases (MOB). 
Chapter III: Forward-Operating Sites (FOS). 
Chapter IV: Cooperative-Security Locations (CSL). 
Chapter V: Joint Pre-position Sites (JPS). 
Chapter VI: En-Route Infrastructure (ERI). 
Chapter VII: A summary of the findings discovered in Chapters II through 
VI will be provided in this final chapter.  Recommendations for policymakers and 
U.S. Air Force strategic planners will also be provided for future consideration.  A 
                                            
66 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 266. 
67 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Base 
Structure Report Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline: A Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory, 2010, 
DOD-5.  The title of this report will be abbreviated to 2010 Base Structure Report for the 
remainder of the document.  Personnel data reflected in this report is derived from the 
Department of Defense’s 2010 Base Structure Report.  The personnel numbers utilized do not 
necessarily identify the exact number of military and civilian members employed at each airfield.  
The personnel totals taken from the 2010 Base Structure Report “attempt to show all personnel 
regardless of Military Service affiliation assigned to individual sites or locations, totals should not 
be confused and viewed as representing only individual Military Service total strength.” 
68 The term permanent in this sense relates to the forces, both aircraft and personnel, being 
stationed at the airfield on a non-rotational basis.  For permanently assigned aircraft, such 
airfields are considered the home base.  Personnel assigned to these airfields are transferred to 
the installation as a Permanent Change of Station, or PCS.  For most USAFE airfields, personnel 
PCSing to the installation usually stay for two to three years. 
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goal of this study is to propose less expensive alternatives (compared to today’s 
basing portfolio) to enable a continued, forward U.S. Air Force presence in 
Europe and other combatant command regions. 
 24
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 25
II. MAIN OPERATING BASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Admiral Stavridis, the current EUCOM Commander, provided the following 
statistical summary of USAFE forces and infrastructure in his 2011 EUCOM 
Posture Statement: 26,000 active-duty, guard and reserve personnel; five main 
operating bases (MOBs); nine wings; and many geographically separated 
locations.69  The five main operating bases in USAFE are: Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany; Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany; Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath 
Air Base, United Kingdom; RAF Mildenhall Air Base, United Kingdom; and 
Aviano Air Base, Italy.  Figure 2 depicts a map of these five MOBs. 
Calder’s definition of a MOB submits specific characteristics of such 
installations: enduring strategic value, common anchor for smaller bases, 
existence of substantial infrastructure, and where troops are stationed with their 
families.70  Michael O’Hanlon, author of Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas 
Military Presence in the 21st Century and a senior fellow at the Brookings 
Institution, establishes “main operating base” as a term applied by the Bush 
Administration71 meaning military facilities “defined as having permanently 
stationed U.S. combat forces, well-developed base infrastructures including for 
family support, and robust security protection.”72  For the purposes of this study  
 
                                            
69 U.S. European Command Posture Statement of 2011, Before the House Appropriations 
Committee, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, 
112th Cong. (2011) written testimony prepared by Admiral James G. Stavridis on March 29, 
2011, accessed October 16, 2011, 27, http://www.eucom.mil/english/Posture-Statement.asp.  
The annual testimony provided to Congress by the nine combatant commanders and service 
chiefs of staff is commonly referred to as the respective command or service’s “Posture 
Statement.”  In this case, Admiral Stavridis’ testimony is referred to as the 2011 EUCOM Posture 
Statement. 
70 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 53. 
71 In this context, the Bush Administration refers to the Presidency of George W. Bush from 
2001–2009. 
72 Michael O’Hanlon, Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st 
Century (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008), 11–12. 
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of U.S. Air Force airfields in Europe, one additional characteristic to the definition 
of MOB was included:  A USAFE MOB is required to be the permanent home of 
USAFE assigned aircraft. 
 
Figure 2.   USAFE Main Operating Bases (After Infoplease, 2011)73 
Does USAFE’s mission require five MOBs?  The five main operating 
bases in USAFE are where the vast majority of its forces are concentrated.  The 
MOBs represent 86 percent of USAFE’s workforce and 99 percent of the 
permanently assigned aircraft.74  All five MOBs are home to at least one Air 
                                            
73 “Europe,”  Infoplease Atlas, accessed December 30, 2011, 
http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/europe.html.  The background map of Europe utilized for Figures 
2-8 was found at the Infoplease.com atlas. 
74 86 percent of workforce as calculated from 2010 Base Structure Report.  99 percent  of 
aircraft is derived from the fact that all USAFE permanently assigned aircraft are based at the five 
main operating bases, except one.  The one exception is a C-37 assigned to Chievres Air Base, 
Belgium in support of SACEUR distinguished visitor airlift requirements.  
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Force wing, the common organizational unit that occupies an Air Force Base 
(both domestic and overseas).  Two sets of MOBs are located within a short 
drive of one another: Ramstein and Spangdahlem are separated by just seventy-
five miles, while Lakenheath and Mildenhall stand less than five miles apart.  All 
five of USAFE MOBs are located in the territory of NATO members (Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom) with whom the United States has developed 
extremely stable security relationships with over the past sixty-plus years.  Thus, 
USAFE is heavily invested in the five MOBs described in this chapter.  The 
question at issue is:  Does USAFE get the most “bang for its buck” in terms of 
reassuring allies, deterrence, conducting operations and building partnerships by 
concentrating its forces at five MOBs, and really only three separate regions of 
Europe? 
B. RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, GERMANY 
A discussion of USAFE’s main operating bases should correctly begin with 
Ramstein Air Base, Germany.  Ramstein is the European base most commonly 
cited in other works as a main operating base.75  Ramstein is home to USAFE 
Headquarters and 3d Air Force.  These two organizations provide the command 
and control of U.S. Air Force personnel and units across Europe.  Additionally, 
17th Air Force, the air and space component to AFRICOM, is a third 
headquarters agency located at Ramstein.  Finally, three USAFE wings call 
Ramstein home: the 86th Airlift Wing, 435th Air Ground Operations Wing and the 
521st Air Mobility Operations Wing. 
Located seven and a half miles west of the city of Kaiserslautern in the 
German state of Rheinland-Pfalz, Ramstein is considered part of the 
Kaiserslautern Military Community (KMC).  The KMC is the largest contingent of  
 
 
                                            
75 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 52 and O’Hanlon, Unfinished Business, 12.  Both Calder 
and O’Hanlon cited Ramstein Air Base, Germany in their studies when providing examples for 
their respective definitions of a main operating base. 
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U.S. military members and their families located outside the Continental United 
States (CONUS).76  Nearly 40,000 U.S. Army and Air Force members and their 
dependents call the KMC home.77 
 The 86th Airlift Wing (86 AW) is considered the host unit at Ramstein Air 
Base.  The installation is home to 10,434 military and civilian personnel,78 a large 
base by Air Force standards.  Five different models of aircraft are assigned to the 
86 AW, combining to make up a fleet of 28 total aircraft: 14 C-130Js, ten C-21As, 
two C-20Hs, one C-37 and one C-40B.  As an airlift wing, the 86 AW is given the 
operational responsibility for conducting theater airlift, distinguished visitor 
transport, airdrop operations and aero medical evacuations.  As Ramstein’s host 
wing, the 86 AW is also tasked with providing quality of life services for the 
military members, their families, and retirees attached to the installation or in the 
surrounding KMC.79 
 Ramstein traces its origins back to Word War II, when it served as an 
airstrip for the Luftwaffe and later the U.S. Army Air Forces as the Allies 
advanced toward Berlin.  In the post-World War II era, the Americans joined with 
the French to build two air bases near Kaiserslautern, which was located within 
France’s occupation zone.  Landstuhl Air Base was the first of the two airfields  
to open—in August of 1952.  Ramstein Air Base opened the following year, on  
June 1, 1953.  The airfield at Landstuhl later closed, but the area remains home 
to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, the largest American hospital outside 
the United States and the only Level I Trauma Center outside the United States.   
 
 
                                            
76 “Kaiserslautern Military Community Kaiserslautern, Germany,” GlobalSecurity.org, last 
modified July 05, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/kaiserslautern.htm.  
77 “Kaiserslautern, Germany,” Military.com Installation Guide, accessed November 13, 2011, 
http://benefits.military.com/misc/installations/Base_Content.jsp?id=1675. 
78 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 Base 
Structure Report, DOD-84. 
79 “86th Airlift Wing,” Ramstein Air Base, accessed November 13, 2011, 
http://www.ramstein.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=14103. 
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Landstuhl Regional Medical Center has proven invaluable to the coalitions 
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing care for thousands of coalition combat 
and noncombat injuries.80 
 Since its opening in 1953, Ramstein has been home to multiple USAF and 
NATO headquarters from 12th Air Force in the 1950s, eventually becoming the 
permanent home of USAFE Headquarters in 1973.  Ramstein and the 86th Wing 
saw their mission and assigned aircraft change periodically throughout the 
decades of the Cold War.  F-4s, F-102s and KC-135s were just a few of the 
multiple types of aircraft that have called Ramstein home during this period.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the 86th Wing was realigned as an Airlift 
Wing, its current designation. 
In 2005, the closure of Air Force facilities at the former Rhein-Main Air 
Base (currently Frankfurt Airport) as part of the $609 million Rhein-Main 
Transition Program expanded the airlift and cargo operations at Ramstein even 
further.81  NATO funded over a third ($210 million) of this infrastructure 
investment at Ramstein.82  This willingness to fund infrastructure investments at 
U.S. operating locations should be explored and exploited to ensure future 
investment costs are shared between all Allied security partners.  With the 
completion of multiple construction projects including a new runway, widened 
taxiways, larger aircraft parking ramps and a new passenger terminal, Ramstein 
was transformed into the European Central Region’s Aerial Port of Embarkation 
for U.S. military forces.83  The upgrades postured Ramstein to take on 
                                            
80 David Rising, “Landstuhl Regional Medical Center Saves U.S. Military Lives in Germany,” 
Huffington Post, September 2, 2011, accessed December 17, 2011, 
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81 Marni McEntee, “Rhein-Main transition program on schedule,” Stars and Stripes, April 20, 
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on-schedule-1.19018. 
82 Department of Defense, Military Construction Program FY2012 Budget, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Security Investment Program: Justification Data Submitted to Congress, 
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83 “Ramstein Air Base,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified July 05, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/ramstein.htm. 
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70 percent of Rhein-Main’s capacities as part of the Rhein-Main Transition 
Program, with Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany scheduled to take on the 
remaining 30 percent. 
Ramstein is an excellent example of what Calder recognizes as a 
significant challenge with maintaining a forward overseas presence with periodic 
shifts in strategy and the security environment.  Calder states, “It is far easier to 
change functions at existing bases than to move bases themselves.”84  This is a 
major reason why funding follows the path of prior investment when dealing with 
airfields.  According to the 2010 Base Structure Report, Ramstein’s Plant 
Replacement Value (PRV)85 is calculated at nearly $3.7 billion, by far the largest 
PRV of any USAFE airfield.86  Add to this figure Ramstein is host to USAFE 
Headquarters, its close proximity to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and other 
U.S. Army units in the greater KMC, its central European location for USAFE’s 
only airlift wing, Ramstein will certainly remain a main operating base for the 
foreseeable future. 
C. SPANGDAHLEM AIR BASE, GERMANY 
 Located approximately seventy-five miles to the northwest of Ramstein in 
the German state of Rheinland-Phalz, Spangdahlem Air Base is the second 
USAFE main operating bases in Germany.  The 52d Fighter Wing (52 FW) is the 
host unit for Spangdahlem, and the base employs 4,883 military and civilian 
personnel.87  For decades, Spangdahlem has been a fighter base with aircraft 
and personnel forces prepared to defend Europe from its central location.  
Today, the fighter base tradition at Spangdahlem continues as twenty-four F-16s 
and eighteen A-10s are assigned to the 52 FW.  However, like many USAFE 
units the 52 FW has expanded its Cold War mission as a fight-in-place force to 
                                            
84 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 35. 
85 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 Base 
Structure Report, DOD-3.  Plant Replacement Value (PRV) “represents the cost to design and 
replace an existing facility using current construction standards and codes.” 
86 Ibid., DOD-84. 
87 Ibid. 
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an organization now prepared to deploy outside of the European theater.  The F-
16s and A-10s of the 52 FW are trained to support military operations through a 
variety of specific missions, to include the suppression of enemy air defenses, 
close air support, air interdiction, and combat search and rescue.88  Over the 
past two decades, 52 FW aircraft and personnel have successfully deployed and 
flown sorties in support of combat operations in the Balkans, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
Spangdahlem was built between 1951 and 1953 in the French Occupation 
Zone of Germany.  The U.S. Air Force took ownership of the base in May of 1953 
as the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing moved to Spangdahlem from France.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, many types of aircraft flying in support of the host 
wing’s mission operated from Spangdahlem.  The 52d Tactical Fighter Wing was 
eventually established at Spangdahlem on December 31, 1971.  Renamed the 
52d Fighter Wing following substantial post-Cold War changes across the Air 
Force, today’s existing force structure and organization of the 52 FW was 
principally put together during the 1990s.89 
The Rhein-Main Transition Program brought about the most significant 
changes to Spangdahlem’s airfield over the past twenty years.  Some 30 percent 
of the cargo and passenger processing operation that previously took place at 
Rhein-Main Air Base was scheduled to transition to Spangdahlem in October of 
2005.  The additions at Spangdahlem included a revamped system of runways 
and taxiways, an aircraft parking apron capable of parking thirteen C-17s, a 
passenger terminal and a special underground refueling system.90  With the 
transition long since complete, Spangdahlem now operates as a joint fighter-
cargo airfield operation. 
                                            
88 “52nd Fighter Wing,” Spangdahlem Air Base, last modified June 18, 2010, 
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This multi-role function now in place at Spangdahlem is a positive move 
for USAFE’s portfolio of airfields.  U.S. Air Force airfields, both domestic and 
overseas, have historically operated under the ownership umbrella of a single 
Major Command.91  With major base reductions, both domestically and 
overseas, occurring since the end of the Cold War many airfields have expanded 
their infrastructure to support multiple missions across numerous Major 
Commands.  Some domestic airfields have encountered significant changes due 
to the DoD’s new joint basing venture92, an inter-service effort to save money by 
consolidating support services and maximizing critical infrastructure.  These 
airfields now host missions from the Air Force and sister services.  Increasing the 
adaptability of USAFE’s airfield portfolio by constructing airfields capable of 
supporting a variety of aircraft (i.e., bombers, tankers, fighters, airlift assets and 
unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms) is one 
recommendation of this thesis. 
D. RAF LAKENHEATH AIR BASE, UNITED KINGDOM 
RAF Lakenheath Air Base is one of two USAFE main operating bases that 
stand less than five miles apart in Suffolk County, United Kingdom. Primarily an 
agricultural community, Suffolk County lies seventy to eighty miles to the 
northeast of London, and the county borders the North Sea to the east.  Both 
USAFE MOBs fall in the western portion of Suffolk County. 
                                            
91 The USAF is currently organized into ten Major Commands.  Within the CONUS, the 
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Lakenheath’s origins as an air base began as World War II broke out and 
the Royal Air Force looked to build “dummy airfields” to confuse German pilots.  
False runway lights and aircraft decoys made of plywood were set-up at the 
Lakenheath site to lure Luftwaffe crews away from other nearby operational RAF 
airfields.  It proved successful as “German crews bombed or strafed RAF 
Lakenheath on at least five different occasions.”93  Lakenheath was quickly 
selected to transition to an operational, satellite airfield for RAF Mildenhall.  
Three runways and numerous hangars were constructed, eventually opening in 
November of 1941.  In 1944, Lakenheath was closed for construction again upon 
its selection (revealed later) as a future home of USAF B-29 Superfortress heavy 
bombers.  Equipped with increased range and bomb load, the B-29 Superfortress 
was extremely effective in the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, which 
eventually ended World War II in the Pacific theater.94  In the very early stages of 
the Cold War, the B-29 served as SAC’s first heavy bomber asset as it was 
deployed to locations throughout Europe and the Pacific. 
Over the next three to four years, the runways at Lakenheath were 
widened and reinforced with concrete as the airfield was prepared for its new role 
as a SAC base.  The United States hoped the B-29’s atomic bomb capability 
would have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union.  Plans were quickly crafted, 
and airfields within the United Kingdom were upgraded to receive rotational B-29 
aircraft.  These upgrades included lengthening and widening the runway to a 
minimum of 8,000 feet long by 200 feet wide, the minimum dimensions required 
to support B-29 operations.95 
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When the Soviets established the Berlin Blockade in June 1948, the 
United States responded with the Berlin Airlift and a show of force with the 
deployment of B-29s to European airfields.  Lakenheath received its first rotation 
of SAC units in August of 1948.  By May of 1951, the U.S. Air Force established 
the 3909th Air Base Group at Lakenheath and “assumed administrative control” 
of the base.96  Lakenheath supported SAC’s rotating fighter and bomber units 
through the 1950s.  Lakenheath’s transition from its post-World War II RAF 
bomber base to a forward-operating location for rotational SAC units is one 
example of changing missions at airfields by building additional infrastructure 
upon previous investments. 
Lakenheath experienced another phase of changing functions at the 
airfield in 1960 when USAFE was forced to withdraw from France.  With the 
French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure under the De Gualle 
presidency, the USAF was forced to relocate several wings and aircraft from 
France.  In January 1960, Lakenheath became the home of the 48th Fighter-
Bomber Wing, which moved from Chaumont Air Base, France.  A multi-million 
dollar investment was made to modify and expand Lakenheath’s infrastructure in 
support of three new fighter squadrons of aircraft and 2,000 additional airmen 
and their families.97  During the next three decades of the Cold War, Lakenheath 
remained a fighter stronghold for USAFE forces. 
Today, the 48th Fighter Wing (48 FW) remains the host unit for the 
installation.  Three squadrons of F-15s totaling seventy-two fighter aircraft and 
one squadron of five HH-60 helicopters consider Lakenheath their home station.  
The 2010 Base Structure Report lists 4,836 military and civilian personnel as 
assigned to the installation.98  Lakenheath is the largest USAFE airfield in the 
United Kingdom in terms of PRV, estimated at over $2.2 billion.99  Overall, 
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Lakenheath is similar in size to Spangdahlem with a nearly equivalent base 
population, despite hosting one more fighter squadron than Spangdahlem 
 The 48 FW carries an operational mission to execute counterair, 
counterland, and combat search and rescue operations.  Over the past decade, 
its aircraft assets and personnel have been forward deployed to U.S. Central 
Command air bases in support of war efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Additionally, F-15s from Lakenheath participated in Operation Unified Protector, 
the NATO-led mission established to respond to the unrest in Libya.100  With the 
requirement of a fight-in-place force seemingly absent from USAFE’s mission, 
the question must be asked if the 48 FW could carry out its operational mission 
from a domestic installation.  The same question will posed of USAFE’s two other 
fighter wings located at Spangdahlem and Aviano.  One of the proposals made 
by this thesis is to return to a similar structure of the early Cold War era where 
strategic bombing assets were deployed to the European theater on a rotational 
basis.  This proposal significantly reduces the permanent footprint assigned to 
these current main operating bases, reducing their classification to either a 
forward-operating site, cooperative-security location or other category of airfield. 
E. RAF MILDENHALL AIR BASE, UNITED KINGDOM 
RAF Mildenhall is the second USAFE main operating bases located in 
Suffolk County, United Kingdom. Mildenhall was the first of these two current 
MOBs built; it opened as one of the “RAF’s largest bomber stations” on October 
16, 1934.101  The airfield was home to RAF Wellington, Stirling, and Lancaster 
bombers throughout World War II.  Bombers from Mildenhall participated in 
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bombing raids against Nazi Germany immediately following the declaration of 
war in 1939 to the end of the war in 1945. 
 Similar to its sister air base at Lakenheath, Mildenhall served as a SAC 
base during the early Cold War era.  Millions of dollars were to lengthen and 
widen the runway to 8,000 feet by 200 feet in order to support B-29 operations.  
SAC gained control of Mildenhall on October 1, 1951, just five months after 
gaining control of Lakenheath.102  Throughout most of the 1950s, SAC fighter 
and bomber units transferred in and out of Mildenhall as part of SAC’s Cold War 
rotation.  However, by 1958 the runway at Mildenhall was not capable of 
supporting the larger, jet-powered bombers employed by SAC.103 
 The remaining decades of the Cold War witnessed Mildenhall’s transition 
from a SAC base to a mobility hub for Military Airlift Command (MAC) within 
Europe.  In 1959, the USAF air passenger terminal for the United Kingdom was 
established at Mildenhall.  Two squadrons of C-130s were based at Mildenhall in 
1966 as part of the 513th Troop Carrier Wing.  The late 1970s and 1980s brought 
a strategic reconnaissance mission to Mildenhall, and with this new mission 
SR-71 and U-2 aircraft arrived at the airfield.  The most recent organizational 
changes for Mildenhall came in the early 1990s as the 100th Air Refueling Wing 
(100 ARW) was activated in January 1992.  Finally, the 352d Special Operations 
Group (352 SOG) transferred to Mildenhall in 1995.104 
 Today, the 100 ARW continues to serve as the host wing for Mildenhall.  
The base employs 3,189 military and civilian members.105  As the sole air 
refueling wing in USAFE, the 100 ARW operates fifteen KC-135 aircraft.  
Refueling the aircraft of the U.S. and NATO partners, the 100 ARW acts as a key 
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component of the “air bridge” across the Atlantic Ocean.106  The only U.S. Air 
Force special operations unit located in Europe, the 352 SOG employs 
approximately ten MC-130 aircraft.  The 352 SOG mission is to plan and execute 
“specialized and contingency operations using advanced aircraft, tactics and air 
refueling techniques to infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply special operations 
forces.”107  The unique mission set (air refueling and special operations) provided 
by the aircraft assets stationed at Mildenhall require this main operating base to 
remain until these assets are relocated within Europe or redeployed to the United 
States. 
Mildenhall is the smallest of the five USAFE main operating bases in 
terms of personnel and PRV.  This is primarily driven by its close proximity with 
Lakenheath that has resulted in the consolidation of many mission support and 
family support functions.  For example, the medical clinic and housing office 
located at Lakenheath support airmen and family members from both USAFE 
main operating bases located in the United Kingdom.  Continued consolidation of 
support functions is expected and should be encouraged to reduce the heavy 
footprint of two main operating bases located within five miles of one another. 
F. AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY 
 Located fifty miles northeast of Venice, Aviano is the only USAFE main 
operating base that was once targeted by U.S. Army Air Forces during World 
War II.108  In fact, Aviano has the longest history of any of USAFE’s main 
operating bases as a military airfield.  The Italian government opened a flight 
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training school at Aviano’s airfield in 1911.  It served as an operational air base 
for the Italian Aeronautical Corps during World War I, and then returned to its 
training mission between the wars.  Italian and German air forces used the base 
during World War II until Allied forces liberated the area.  The Royal Air Force 
later seized control of Aviano and maintained control of the field until 1947,109  
when the airfield was returned to Italian Air Force ownership. 
 Following the establishment of a basing rights agreement between the 
United States and Italy in 1954, the first significant U.S. Air Force presence 
arrived at Aviano.  In 1955, Aviano was designated by USAFE as the priority 
airfield for Tactical Air Command’s (TAC) rotational units, and the 7207th Air 
Base Squadron was moved from Germany to Aviano.  Throughout the Cold War 
era, Aviano continued to host multiple flying units deployed to the airfield on a 
rotational basis.  However, Aviano experienced substantial growth in the post-
Cold War era. 
The end of the Cold War saw significant force reductions (aircraft, 
personnel, and bases) within USAFE.  These reductions saw many organizations 
deactivated and others relocated.  One relocation occurred in 1992 as the 401st 
Fighter Wing and Sixteenth Air Force moved to Aviano from Torrejon Air Base, 
Spain.  The following year, the Italians agreed to the permanent assignment of 
two squadrons of F-16s at the northern Italian air base.  Italian acceptance of the 
two fighter squadrons was prompted by NATO’s $465 million investment in 
Aviano’s infrastructure.110  Finally, the 603d Air Control Squadron was relocated 
to the base from Germany in 1994, and the 31st Fighter Wing (31 FW) replaced 
the 401st Fighter Wing as the host unit.  In just a few years, Aviano’s permanent 
population grew by 2,000 airmen, and the installation was named a main 
operating base by NATO in July 1994.111   
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 Aviano’s close proximity to the Balkans proved crucial for NATO air 
operations in the region throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  In 1999, the 31 
FW saw its forces surge to 150 aircraft and over 6,000 personnel during 
Operation Allied Force, a seventy-eight–day strategic bombing campaign that 
ended ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  Today, the air base remains home for 4,260 
military and civilian members,112 and forty-two F-16 aircraft of the 31 FW.  Similar 
to other USAFE assigned flying squadrons, the personnel and F-16s of Aviano’s 
31 FW continue to support contingency operations in U.S. Central Command’s 
area of responsibility through rotational deployments. 
 Aviano represents the third USAFE main operating base that hosts a 
fighter wing (Spangdahlem and Lakenheath are the other two).  Without a direct 
air threat within the European theater, the necessity of maintaining three main 
operating bases to host three permanent fighter wings must be questioned.  One 
proposal to investigate is the return to rotational fighter squadrons deploying to 
airfields within Europe similar to the concept practiced by SAC with rotational 
bomber and fighter units in the early stages of the Cold War. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAFE MAIN OPERATING BASES 
The five USAFE main operating bases represent the Command’s largest 
investment and heaviest footprint.  As the second column in Table 1 reflects, 
history’s legacy holds as money does follow the path of previous investments 
with Air Force airfields in Europe.  The U.S. Air Force has maintained a presence 
at all five MOBs for nearly sixty years.  Constructed either before World War II or 
during the early stages of the Cold War, all five MOBs were selected to serve 
specific Cold War missions.  By the end of the Cold War, these original USAF 
missions had changed or ended.  Yet infrastructure investments enabled the 
MOBs to adjust in support of new missions and aircraft, and the MOBs retain 
their strategic relevance today. 
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Table 1.   USAFE Main Operating Bases 
 The expectation is USAFE’s five MOBs will persist as USAFE airfields.  
The third column of Table 1, PRV, represents the estimated cost of replacing 
each MOB.  Nearly $10.5 billion of infrastructure is in place at these five airfields, 
an enormous investment.  Each MOB is equivalent to a small city with thousands 
of residents and extensive family support complexes.  The question becomes is 
this entire infrastructure necessary to fulfill USAFE’s current mission 
requirements. 
 For the past decade, USAFE units assigned to its main operating bases 
frequently forward deployed to support combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Were U.S. Allies in the European theater more vulnerable when the 
rotational deployments to CENTCOM’s theater (arguably) reduced USAFE 
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capability?  Does a requirement still exist for the United States to maintain 
operational fighter squadrons in Europe to support rotational deployments to 
destinations outside the European theater, or can fighters located stateside 
support these same requirements? 
NATO allies maintain some of the largest air forces in the world.  The 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and Greece all operate advanced fighter aircraft.  
Many of these European partners currently operate F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft, 
while other allies operate the Eurofighter Typhoon or other advanced fighters.  
Additionally, six NATO allies are Security Cooperative Participants collaborating 
on the F-35 Lightning II, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.  The JSF is expected 
to be the next generation fighter, equipped with stealth technology and a host of 
other sophisticated technologies.113 
With the current fighter capabilities of European allies and commitment to 
sustain advanced air forces, one wonders if the United States is still required to 
augment these forces with operational fighter wings permanently placed in 
Europe.  Furthermore, the Cold War requirement for a fight-in-place force on the 
European continent no longer exists.  Maintaining three tactical fighter wings on 
the European continent comes with a large price tag.  The three fighter wings at 
Spangdahlem, Mildenhall, and Aviano average 4,660 personnel and a PRV of 
$1.8 billion per base.  In comparison to lower-level installations reviewed in 
subsequent chapters, the investment in people and infrastructure to support a 
USAF stand-alone wing at a main operating base is exorbitantly high. 
This thesis proposes the fighters located at Spangdahlem, Lakenheath, 
and Aviano be redeployed to airfields within the CONUS.  Consideration should 
be given to rotational deployments of fighters to airfields in Europe, similar to the 
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rotational deployments of SAC bombers during the early years of the Cold War.  
Where the SAC bomber deployments were largely a show of force exercise to 
reassure allies of U.S. commitment and deter Soviet aggression, the twenty-first 
century rotational deployment of fighters would be to assist in training and 
building the partnership capacity of NATO allies.  When crises and conflicts 
warrant fighter support of combat operations, rotational deployments could 
support these requirements as well. 
This measure would enable these three main operating bases to be 
reconfigured to support the rotational deployments of fighters and other aircraft to 
Europe.  The airfields can be transformed from a main operating base to lower 
level installations, like forward-operating sites or a cooperative security locations.  
Forward-operating sites like Fairford, Incirlik, and Morón are maintained in 
“warm” status with the ability to expand in support of specific training events and 
contingencies.  Cooperative security locations are operated with significant 
support from the host nation or NATO Alliance, allowing the U.S. footprint at 
these airfields to substantially reduced.  The next chapters will demonstrate how 
infrastructure costs are significantly smaller at lower-level installations. 
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III. FORWARD-OPERATING SITES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Technological developments now allow the U.S. Air Force to conduct 
many of its core functions from airfields and installations within the CONUS.  For 
example, B-1, B-2, and B-52 aircraft, with air refueling assistance from the USAF 
tanker fleet, are able to conduct precision strikes in any corner of the globe.  
Strategic airlift assets are launched daily from CONUS airfields to deliver 
personnel and supplies around the world.  Satellite links enable operators at 
locations within the United States to control unmanned systems flying over 
Afghanistan as part of the globally integrated ISR network.  Technology has 
definitely made the world smaller. 
Blaker points out the United States often abandoned parts of its overseas 
basing system when, particularly through technological advances, “sites 
appeared at the time to be redundant and not worth the cost of maintaining.”114  
This calculus would work if every base site were a MOB.  However, alternatives 
to multi-billion dollar main operating bases do exist, and one alternative is 
referred to as a forward-operating site. 
Forward-operating sites are often characterized as being in a “warm”115 
status or identified as a “bare-bones”116 facility.  A small, permanent U.S. Air 
Force presence is maintained at these airfields, which generally takes the form of 
airmen providing support through a variety of different functions (i.e., security, 
medical, family services).  The American population, airmen and their families, is 
typically 10 percent to 20 percent of is the total stationed at MOBs.  Zero aircraft 
are permanently assigned to these locations.  However, forward-operating sites 
have the capacity to expand in support of larger, rotational forces.  Three USAFE 
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115 Jim Garamone, “Jones Says Changes to U.S. Posture Will Strengthen Europe,” 
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116 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 53. 
 44
airfields meet the criteria of a forward-operating site: RAF Fairford Air Base, 
United Kingdom; Incirlik Air Base, Turkey; and Morón Air Base, Spain. 
This chapter explores the infrastructure, past and present, and capabilities 
presented at USAFE’s three forward-operating sites, depicted in Figure 3.  It 
provides good case-study evidence that increasing the number of FOS—
principally by converting other bases—will give USAFE the capability and the 
flexibility to meet its strategic mission requirements at lower costs. 
 
Figure 3.   USAFE Forward-Operating Sites (After Infoplease, 2011) 
B. RAF FAIRFORD AIR BASE, UNITED KINGDOM 
 Located approximately ninety miles due west of London, RAF Fairford was 
constructed in 1944 to support the Allies’ pending D-Day invasion.117  Much like 
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/fairford.htm. 
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Lakenheath and Mildenhall, Fairford became a SAC base in the early stages of 
the Cold War.  In 1950, the installation was transferred to U.S. Air Force control 
with the intent of establishing strategic bomber operations at the air base.  Where 
the runways at Lakenheath and Mildenhall were built to B-29 requirements, the 
runway at Fairford in 1950 was designed for the long range bomber operations.  
In support of the larger bombers like the B-36, B-47 and B-52, the runway was 
extended to a length of 10,000 feet and a width of 300 feet.  The SAC mission at 
Fairford remained until the 1970s, at which point the airfield was chosen to be the 
British flight test center for the Concorde supersonic airliner.118  The USAF 
returned to Fairford during the 1980s with KC-135 aircraft, only to leave again in 
the 1990s.  In 1990, Fairford was declared to be in “standby status.”119 
 “Standby status” does not mean “idle.”  Fairford has played a vital role in 
numerous combat operations over the past two decades.  American bombers 
(B-52 and B-1 aircraft) and KC-135 aircraft have deployed to Fairford in support 
of nearly every major combat operation since 1990.  Fairford’s expansive 
capacity is highlighted by the 1999 deployment of thirteen B-52s, five B-1s, and 
five KC-135s in support of NATO’s Operation Allied Force.120  Additionally, 
Fairford boasts the capability to provide “sixty parking spaces for bombers or 
other aircraft, and secured hangar space for three B-2s, … and lodging for up to 
900 additional personnel.”121  In 2002, a $100 million upgrade to Fairford’s 
runway and fuel systems was completed.  Reinforcing the benefits of alliance in 
maintaining critical infrastructure, this project was funded by NATO. 
 The host unit at Fairford is the 420th Air Base Squadron (420 ABS).  The 
base is home to 218 military and civilian personnel,122 providing a wide range of 
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support to rotational forces deployed to the airfield.  Fairford is considered 
USAFE’s only forward operating location for U.S. Air Force bombers. 
In comparison to the two USAFE main operating bases  located in the 
United Kingdom (Lakenheath and Mildenhall), the PRV for Fairford is estimated 
at $0.6 billion.  This total is less than half of Mildenhall’s infrastructure 
investment, and it is almost a quarter of Lakenheath’s PRV.  As a forward-
operating site, Fairford does not have aircraft permanently assigned to the 
airfield, which substantially reduces the total number of personnel permanently 
assigned to the installation.  With a much smaller population to support, USAFE 
provides significantly less family support services.  Located in a well-developed 
ally like the United Kingdom, Fairford’s American population is able to rely 
heavily on the family support services of the local community surrounding the 
installation. 
While Fairford has historically hosted USAF bombers, forward-operating 
sites within USAFE’s AOR, today and into tomorrow, should be designed to host 
a wide variety of aircraft assets.  The twenty-first century security environment 
demands maximum flexibility, including installation adaptability.  With an existing 
capacity to park sixty bombers or other aircraft and a long, wide runway, 
adjustments to Fairford’s massive airfield infrastructure to support a variety of 
airframes would likely not be an expensive endeavor.  Moreover, additions to 
Fairford’s relatively small, permanent workforce would not be expected. 
C. INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY 
 Incirlik Air Base is by far the largest of the three USAFE forward-operating 
sites in terms of personnel assigned.  It is reported 1,528 military and civilian 
members123 are assigned to the installation.  The 39th Air Base Wing (39 ABW) 
is the host unit at Incirlik Air Base.  An additional 200 to 300 contractors assist in 
supporting the services provided by the 39 ABW as part of the Turkey-Spain 
Base Maintenance Contract, which is discussed in further detail in the next 
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section.  Located just outside the southern Turkish city of Adana, Incirlik provides 
the U.S. a strategically important presence and forward-operating site just north 
of Iraq and adjacent to the Levant region. 
 Built by the U.S. Engineering Group, Incirlik opened in February of 1955 
with the relocation and activation of the 7216th Air Base Squadron from Wheelus 
Field, Libya to Incirlik.124  Initially intended as a forward staging base for SAC’s 
medium and heavy bombers, Incirlik is better known for the U-2 reconnaissance 
missions that operated from the airfield during the 1950s.  During the 1970s, the 
base’s critically important association with NATO security responsibilities enabled 
Incirlik to survive the Turkish demand to close all American military bases inside 
its borders.  (This demand was in response to the U.S. imposed arms embargo 
that followed Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus.  By 1980, normal relations were re-
established with Turkey, and multiple types of fighters and other aircraft were 
based at Incirlik through the next decade.)125 
 Despite occasional difficulties relating to political negotiations between the 
United States and Turkey,126 Incirlik played a vital role for the U.S. Air Force in 
support of operations in Central Command’s AOR over the past two decades.  
During Operation Desert Storm more than 4,600 combat sorties were launched 
from this southern Turkish airfield.127  For a twelve-year period between 1991 
and 2003, American fighters flew from Incirlik in support of Operation Northern 
Watch.  During the past decade, it has continued to be a strategically important 
airfield location as USAF aircrews have flown thousands of sorties in support of 
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Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom from 
Incirlik.  KC-135s and C-17s generated from Incirlik have been flying missions 
into Iraq and Afghanistan for many years.128 
 Incirlik’s changing role from a fighter base to a mobility hub over the past 
two decades serves as an excellent example of how forward-operating sites can 
provide mission flexibility for USAFE operations.  Incirlik’s airfield infrastructure 
includes a runway built for SAC’s long-range bombers (10,000 feet long by 300 
feet wide), fifty-seven hardened aircraft shelters, and adequate parking and 
fueling systems for strategic air mobility assets.  Due to its location near the 
volatile Middle East and close proximity to Iran, Incirlik remains a key FOS for 
USAFE and military operations at large. 
D. MORÓN AIR BASE, SPAIN 
 The 496th Air Base Squadron (496 ABS) is the host USAF unit at Morón 
Air Base, Spain.  A sub-organization of the 86th Operations Group at Ramstein 
Air Base, the 496 ABS is responsible for a wide array of support services for 
squadron members permanently assigned to Morón and the numerous aircraft 
and airmen that transit the installation every year.  Approximately 138 military 
and civilian personnel are assigned to the base,129 with assignments to Morón 
ranging from fifteen to twenty-four months in duration dependent on 
accompanied or unaccompanied status.  An additional 320 contractors assist in 
supporting the day-to-day operations at Morón.130  The contractors at Morón are 
part of Vinnell, Brown & Root LLC (VBR), to which USAFE awarded a four-and-a-
half-year, $335 million contract in January 2010.  Under the Turkey-Spain Base 
Maintenance Contract, VBR is tasked to provide “program management, civil 
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engineering, base services, logistics support, air terminal and ground handling, 
postal services and communications, occupational health/industrial hygiene and 
ambulance services” at locations in Turkey and Spain.131 
 The 496 ABS was established at Morón in July of 1994, but the U.S. Air 
Force’s presence at the installation extends back to September 1953, when 
negotiations pertaining to Spanish-American air bases were finalized.  
Construction at the base had started in 1940 by Spanish forces, but USAF forces 
did not arrive until the late 1950s.  A total of three major air bases and two minor 
air bases were constructed in Spain for the USAF.  By the end of the decade, 
6,000 American airmen were serving in Spain.  Sandars estimates nearly $267 
million was spent on the construction of the five U.S. airfields in Spain from 1953 
to 1963.132  Morón, like the other two major air bases constructed at Zaragoza 
and Torrejon, was originally designed for SAC’s long-range bombers.  Rotational 
SAC forces initially utilized all three bases.  Morón was downgraded to a 
“modified caretaker status” in November 1971,133 and it has remained a 
“standby” base ever since. 
 Located in the southwest tip of Spain, Morón’s infrastructure includes an 
in-ground aircraft refueling system, parking aprons capable of supporting twenty 
C-5s and temporary lodging facilities capable of housing 1,000 airmen.  The 
USAF has put Morón’s infrastructure to use time-and-time again during the past 
twenty years.  In 1991, the base hosted twenty-four B-52s, 3 KC-135s and more 
than 2,800 personnel in support of Operation Desert Storm.  The 92nd Air 
Expeditionary Wing, the “largest Tanker Wing since the Vietnam War,” was 
temporarily established at Morón in support of Operation Allied Force in February 
1999.  During this period, thirty-seven tankers (KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft) and 
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more than 800 personnel were based at this vital forward-operating site.134  Over 
the past decade, USAF aircraft flying to/from the United States and the Central 
Command’s AOR frequently transition through Morón.  Finally, as recently as the 
spring and summer of this year, Morón was utilized as a staging base for KC-135 
aircraft135 flying in support of Operation Unified Protector. 
 Recent history shows Morón has the flexibility to expand in support of both 
bombers and tankers, depending on USAFE mission requirements.  Morón 
serves as an excellent model for infrastructure investment and base support 
operations desired of a forward-operating site.  Like Fairford and Incirlik, Morón’s 
airfield infrastructure should be maximized to support as wide a variety of aircraft 
missions as possible (i.e., fighters, ISR platforms, command and control assets). 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORWARD-OPERATING SITES 
In these times of tremendous budget cuts and constraints, it may seem 
odd to recommend growth within USAFE’s airfield portfolio.  However, FOS 
installations provide USAFE opportunities to respond to a wide spectrum of 
crises, exactly what the twenty-first century security environment requires.  As 
such, the United States would do well not just to maintain the FOS that it 
currently has in Europe but to increase their number in the name of strategic and 
economic efficiency. 
All three USAFE main operating bases that host fighter wings could be 
easily converted to forward-operating sites.  This conversion would require the 
divestment of millions of dollars of infrastructure and the reduction of thousands 
of permanently assigned airmen assigned to the three MOBs.  Considering that 
the three MOBs in question are all located within the territory of NATO allies with 
well-developed air forces, reductions in infrastructure and personnel by USAFE 
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may invite growth by these NATO allies at the airfields in questions.  Such growth 
could quickly translate into increased training opportunities and capacity building. 
 Of course, some streamlining in the FOS would help, as well.  A snapshot 
of the information listed in Table 2 highlights the disparity between Incirlik and the 
other two USAFE forward-operating sites. Opportunities to reduce Incirlik’s large 
workforce and footprint should be investigated as USAFE’s airfield portfolio is 
evaluated for future posturing.  The PRV associated with Incirlik’s infrastructure is 
higher than all USAFE airfields with the exception of two main operating bases, 
Ramstein and Lakenheath.  Incirlik’s employee population of 1,528 airmen is 
more aligned with the base populations found at USAFE main operating bases.  
This total is nearly ten times the base populations found at the two other USAFE 
forward-operating sites.  The difference in the size of the base populations 
explains the significant difference in the PRV associated with each installation, 
and Incirlik is the only airfield of the three FOS with base support operations 
































Table 2.   USAFE Forward-Operating Sites 
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Both Fairford and Morón support functions are organized under air base 
squadrons.  While Turkey is a NATO ally, it is also a Muslim country with 
considerable cultural differences from the United States.  These cultural 
differences require greater investments in family support services than the other 
two FOS.  The question is whether opportunities exist to partner with Turkey or 
other NATO allies to provide base support functions at Incirlik (and other NATO 




IV. COOPERATIVE-SECURITY LOCATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Europe remains an extremely important region for the United States, 
politically, economically and militarily.  The vast majority of European nations 
share a common bond with the United States in promoting democracy, free 
markets and open societies.136  The European Union (EU), “a unique economic 
and political partnership between twenty-seven European countries,”137 has deep 
economic ties with the U.S.  Derek E. Mix, an analyst in European affairs for the 
Congressional Research Service, identified the U.S.-EU economic relationship 
as the “largest trade and investment relationship in the world…comprising more 
than half of global gross domestic product.”138  Militarily, the U.S. has partnered 
with a growing number of European nations (and Canada) since the end of World 
War II to form NATO, the world’s “preeminent security institution.”  These strong 
ties with Europe present USAFE with an opportunity to leverage the existing 
cooperation between the United States and Europe to diversify and add flexibility 
into its airfield portfolio.  Cooperative-security locations (CSL) will enable USAFE 
to diversify and add flexibility with minimal investment by the United States. 
A CSL is defined by the DoD as “a facility located outside the United 
States and U.S. territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence, maintained 
with periodic Service, contractor, or host-nation support.”139  CSLs provide U.S. 
forces access for security cooperation activities and contingencies.  Calder adds 
CSLs are “mainly located in ‘arc-of-instability’ nations,”140 which appears to follow 
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the DoD’s practice for establishing CSLs.  Hebert cites examples of CSLs as the 
airfields at Dakar, Senegal; Entebbe, Uganda; and Libreville, Gabon.141  Several 
other resources only identified CSLs in Latin America and Africa. 
 Do airfields that operate as cooperative-security locations even exist 
within the European AOR?  Following the definition of a CSL above, this question 
is difficult to answer in regard to USAFE airfields.  Europe is not considered part 
of the “arc-of-instability,” yet USAFE forces frequently operate from airfields with 
little or no permanent U.S. presence in support of training exercises or 
contingency operations.  One could argue that every airfield within the territory of 
a NATO ally is a possible CSL since the transatlantic alliance is built on the 
pillars of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.142  As 
previously noted, the permanent presence of USAFE personnel, aircraft or 
materiel is a necessary characteristic for an airfield to be considered part of the 
USAFE portfolio.  Therefore, for an airfield to qualify as a CSL, at least a small, 
permanent U.S. presence must be established at the installation. 
Figure 4 displays the six USAFE cooperative-security locations identified 
are all controlled and operated by the host nation, NATO ally.  The host nation of 
each CSL provides all airfield support functions (i.e., air traffic control and airport 
security).  The U.S. presence consists of personnel integrated into NATO’s 
operational wing located at the installation, or a munitions support squadron 
collocated with a nuclear-capable fighter wing of a NATO ally.  Airfields operating 
as CSLs, especially those operating in support of NATO’s integrated flying wings, 
offer an excellent model for USAFE’s twenty-first–century forward posture.  
Western European nations are well-developed, stable democracies with 
extremely capable air forces of their own.  Greater reliance and partnership with 
host nations should be welcomed in parallel efforts to build partner capacity and 
reduce U.S. costs. 
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Figure 4.   USAFE Cooperative-Security Locations (After Infoplease, 2011) 
B. NATO’S INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL WINGS 
Within the past thirty years, NATO has established two multinational flying 
organizations in order to provide the Alliance with a specific capability.  The E-3A 
Component143 was established at Geilenkirchen, Germany, to provide an 
airborne early warning capability, greatly enhancing air defense.  Recently, a 
strategic airlift capability was produced with the establishment of the Heavy Airlift 
Wing (HAW) at Papa Airfield, Hungary.  Both multi-national organizations are 
explored in detail below. 
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1. NATO Air Base Geilenkirchen, Germany 
The British Royal Air Force first built an air base at Geilenkirchen in 1951.  
At the time, this section of northwest Germany fell within the United Kingdom’s 
occupation sector.  In March 1968, the British returned the base to German 
control.  Later that same year, the German Air Force moved a Missile Wing to 
Geilenkirchen.  In 1980, the German Missile Wing was relocated as construction 
began to prepare for the arrival of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning Force and its 
E-3A aircraft. 
Today, the air base in Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to NATO’s E-3A 
Component.  Activated in 1982, the E-3A Component was NATO’s first 
integrated, multi-national flying unit.  The organization is comprised of more than 
2,900 military and civilian members from seventeen NATO nations.144  
Seventeen E-3A aircraft are assigned to the E-3A Component at Geilenkirchen, 
and fully integrated, multinational crews representing all seventeen participating 
nations operate the aircraft. 
The United States is one of the larger elements of the E-3A Component at 
Geilenkirchen.  Currently, the United States represents approximately 20 percent 
of the installation’s workforce.  The 569 Americans employed at the airfield have 
two primary functions.145  The airmen of the 470th Air Base Squadron (470 ABS) 
supply the majority of family support functions (i.e., child development center, 
medical, education services, and legal) located at the air base.  The remaining 
portions of the workforce are the aircrew members and maintainers embedded 
within the command structure of the E-3A integrated multi-national organization.  
The U.S. share of the workforce does not appear to be out of line or imbalanced.  
However, this division of labor and responsibilities should be closely monitored 
and scrutinized due to the on-going financial crisis in Europe to ensure the 
burden for U.S. airmen does not dramatically increase.  
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The E-3A Component now has a twenty-five-year history of successful 
support to military operations and humanitarian relief efforts within Europe and 
around the globe.146  The air base at Geilenkirchen and the E-3A Component 
represent a true collaborative effort among the seventeen participating NATO 
nations.  Its organization, infrastructure and funding mechanism should be 
studied in an effort to produce other integrated multi-national units and airfields.   
The United States and USAFE should encourage NATO to explore similar 
efforts. 
2. Papa Airfield, Hungary 
The Heavy Airlift Wing located at Papa Airfield in Hungary is the second 
multi-national flying organization established by NATO.  Since 2006, several 
NATO nations worked to establish a strategic airlift capability within the Alliance.  
Papa Airfield was selected to be the main operating base for the future HAW in 
2007, and an initial memorandum of understanding was signed in 2008.  Today, 
twelve nations participate in the organizational structure of the HAW, and they 
operate three C-17 aircraft. 
Originally built in 1936, Papa Airfield has a long history as a military 
airfield.  Like many of the U.S. airfields in Europe during the Cold War, Papa 
Airfield experienced frequent mission changes.  New technology and strategy 
adjustments resulted in new investments in the airfield’s infrastructure.147 
The total population, HAW personnel and family members, at Papa Airfield 
is just over 600 personnel.  Exact numbers for the USAF element were not 
identified, but the total number of Americans assigned to Papa Airfield is thought 
to be relatively small.  Where Geilenkirchen employed a full squadron (470 ABS) 
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of approximately 150 members to carry out family support functions, only six 
individuals are employed at Papa Airfield for similar mission support 
responsibilities.148  An increased reliance on the local community and reachback 
capabilities to fulfill mission support functions has been initially set up for 
Americans assigned to this new multi-national endeavor.  The HAW organization 
warrants periodic evaluation to identify if this lean structure is working. 
C. USAFE MUNITIONS SUPPORT SQUADRONS (MUNSS) 
Another type of CSL airfield within the European AOR involves a 
specialized military capability that the United States provides.  With nuclear 
weapons remaining as a portion of NATO’s arsenal, the United States continues 
to supply focused support to the non-strategic nuclear weapons positioned on the 
continent.  These four airfields offer an alternative CSL model in which the United 
States is tasked to provide assistance and expertise for a unique task or mission 
set.  The spotlight of the current version of this particular CSL model shines 
brightly on the deployment of nuclear weapons within Europe.  Do not let this 
controversial subject obscure this version of the CSL model employed by the 
United States in Europe.  Future CSL airfields following this model could be 
organized around other mission support tasks like air traffic control or cargo 
operations (especially if the host nation capacity pertaining to a specific task is 
lacking). 
Currently, the 38th Munitions Maintenance Group (38 MMG) based at 
Spangdahlem is believed to hold the responsibility of maintaining the arsenal of 
Pre-positioned non-strategic nuclear weapons.  This critical responsibility of the 
38 MMG could not be confirmed by any sources used during the research of this 
project.  However, the 38 MMG is the command echelon above four 
geographically separated munitions support squadrons located at four NATO 
fighter installations: Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium; Büchel Air Base, Germany; 
                                            
148 “Newcomer’s Guide: United States Air Force version,” Heavy Airlift Wing, Version 2011.1, 
November 18, 2011, accessed December 29, 2011, 
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Ghedi Torre Air Base, Italy; and Volkel Air Base, Netherlands.  It is assumed the 
four geographically separated squadrons are collocated with these nuclear-
capable fighter wings to specifically support the non-strategic nuclear weapons 
deployed to each location.  Details pertaining to the four munitions support 
squadrons located at each of these NATO airfields are summarized below. 
1. Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium 
Kleine Brogel Air Base was first opened by the Belgian Air Force in March 
1945.  Through most of the Cold War, Kleine Brogel was home to Belgian 
fighters sitting alert in preparation to defend Western Europe from a Soviet 
advance.  Today, the Belgian Air Force operates F-16s from the installation.149  
USAFE’s 701st Munitions Support Squadron (701 MUNSS) also considers Kleine 
Brogel home.  The 2010 Base Structure Report indicates 137 U.S. employees 
are assigned to the installation.150  In 2005, Hans M. Kristensen of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, an environmental action group, reported the Belgian 
Air Force installation stores twenty B61 nuclear bombs for delivery by Belgian 
F-16s.151 
2. Büchel Air Base, Germany 
A main operating base for the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), Büchel Air 
Base is home to the German 33d Fighter Bomber Wing.  The airfield was 
originally built in the post-World War II era by French occupation forces.152  
Today, the Luftwaffe operates PA-200 Tornado aircraft from the airfield, and they 
share the installation with USAFE’s 702d Munitions Support Squadron (702 
                                            
149 “Dossier: Kleine Brogel,” Friends of the Earth: Flanders & Brussels, accessed November 
26, 2011, http://www.motherearth.org/nuke/dossierkb.php. 
150 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 
Base Structure Report, DOD-80. 
151 Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Natural Resources Defense 
Council (February 2005): 84. 
152 “Buchel,” Wikipedia, last modified November 7, 2011, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%BCchel. 
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MUNSS).  The German Air Force base is home to 137 U.S. personnel.153  
Numerous sources suggest twenty B61 nuclear bombs continue to be housed at 
the airfield.  These nuclear bombs are maintained by the 702 MUNSS, and they 
are to be delivered by the German Tornado aircraft.154 
3. Ghedi Torre Air Base, Italy 
Located in northern Italy, Ghedi Torre Air Base is considered a main 
operating base of the Italian Air Force.  The Italian Air Force’s 6th Wing operates 
PA-200 Tornado aircraft from the installation.  While an exact date of when the 
airfield was originally constructed was not discovered, initial USAF presence at 
Ghedi Torre was reported in 1963 with the first MUNSS unit being assigned to 
the air base.155  Today, in addition to the Italian Air Forces located at Ghedi 
Torre, USAFE’s 704th Munitions Support Squadron (704 MUNSS) is stationed at 
the airfield.  Some 140 U.S. military and civilian members are assigned to the 
installation.156  Kristensen’s 2005 report suggests forty B61 nuclear bombs are 
stored at Ghedi Torre, and the base-assigned Italian Air Force Tornadoes are the 
expected delivery vehicles for the bombs.157 
4. Volkel Air Base, Netherlands 
In 1941, German occupation forces built Volkel Air Base in the 
Netherlands.  It came under the control of the Royal Netherlands Air Force 
(RNLAF) in 1950, and the first USAF presence is reported to have arrived at the 
installation in the 1960s.158  Today, Volkel is one of three main operating bases 
                                            
153 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 
Base Structure Report, DOD-81. 
154 Kristensen, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 81. 
155 “Nuclear Information: US nuclear weapons in Europe,” Friends of the Earth: Flanders & 
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for the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and it is home to three squadrons of Dutch 
F-16s.  The Dutch Air Base is home to 142 U.S. personnel and the 703d 
Munitions Support Squadron (703 MUNSS) is USAFE’s permanent presence at 
the airfield.159  Volkel is believed to house twenty B61 nuclear bombs to be 
delivered by Dutch F-16s as part of NATO’s nuclear strike force.160 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAFE COOPERATIVE-SECURITY 
LOCATIONS 
Two distinct types of Cooperative-Security Locations have been identified 
through this analysis.  First, the United States participation in NATO’s multi-
national flying organizations produces two current CSLs within Europe.  
Gelienkirchen’s E-3A Component and the Heavy Airlift Wing located at Papa 
Airfield in Hungary reflect NATO’s ongoing commitment to collective defense.  
Both organizations provide a unique capability (airborne command and control, 
and strategic airlift) for the Alliance in support of operations within the European 
theater and around the world.  The United States should advocate for additional 
NATO integrated wings to follow in the footsteps of the E-3A Component at 
Geilenkirchen and HAW at Papa Airfield.  Within the European AOR where the 
NATO Alliance continues to expand, this CSL model appears promising in the 
parallel efforts to build partnership capacity and to reduce U.S. costs. 
The USAF presence at Papa Airfield exemplifies a twenty-first-century 
approach with greater reliance on the host nation military and local communities 
for support.  Consider the substantial difference in “# of personnel” (Table 3) 
assigned to Geilenkirchen in comparison to the workforce at Papa Airfield.  
Americans assigned to the HAW will not find the family support structure that is 
commonplace among U.S.-run bases around the globe.  Instead, HAW personnel 
will partner with local communities within Hungary and rely on reachback 
capabilities to other USAFE main operating bases like Ramstein and Aviano for 
                                            
159 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 
Base Structure Report, DOD-90.  Volkel Air Base is captured under “Other Sites” within the 
Netherlands. 
160 Kristensen, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 88. 
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support.  If successful, Geilenkirchen and other USAFE airfields with larger family 






























































































Table 3.   USAFE Cooperative-Security Locations 
The second set of USAFE Cooperative-Security Locations is the result of 
a highly specialized task owned by the United States within the NATO Alliance.  
Four munitions support squadrons are collocated with the nuclear-capable fighter 
wings of four host nations.  As Table 3 shows, USAF infrastructure commitments 
(reflected by PRV) and personnel assigned are comparable at these four 
locations.  USAFE will retain this responsibility as long as the Heads of State of 
NATO nations determine non-strategic nuclear weapons will remain in Europe.  
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Based on the political climate across many NATO nations and increased 
pressure to remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from European soil,161 
reductions or a complete cut of this requirement are expected in the future. 
While the four MUNSS units may disappear, the CSL model, centered on 
USAFE supplying personnel and infrastructure in support of specialized tasks, 
provides other opportunities for the United States to consider.  Since the end of 
the Cold War, NATO has expanded by twelve members, many of which were ex-
Soviet bloc countries.  The democracies of these new NATO members are less 
mature, and their militaries are significantly smaller than the NATO allies of 
western Europe.162  USAFE should be prepared for opportunities to establish 
task-specific CSLs within the borders of these new NATO Allies.  The United 
States stands to benefit from the creation of additional CSLs through 
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V. JOINT PRE-POSITION SITES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
These facilities are set up as large storehouses where incoming 
units can quickly pick up equipment without being compelled to rely 
on scarce airlift capabilities, “capitalizing on the strategic advantage 
of being an ‘ocean closer’ to engagement, conflict, and 
influence.”163 
 
 This definition of joint pre-position sites (JPS) is derived from Calder’s 
book, Embattled Garrisons.  The vast majority of U.S. Pre-positioned equipment 
belongs to its ground forces, both Army and Marines.  However, the U.S. Air 
Force does have Pre-positioned equipment, commonly referred to as war reserve 
materiel (WRM).  U.S. Air Force WRM includes a variety of equipment ranging 
from expeditionary airfield equipment, medical equipment, vehicles and 
munitions. 
Gone are the days where USAFE WRM was pre-positioned at numerous 
collocated operating bases of NATO allies.  During the Cold War, these bases 
were “stockpiled with equipment and munitions to provide a reception base to 
support deploying forces into Europe.”164  Today, USAFE’s WRM stockpiles are 
significantly reduced, and just three joint pre-position sites remain: one at 
Sanem, Luxembourg, and two airfields in Norway. 
The 86th Materiel Maintenance Squadron (86 MMS) at Ramstein is 
responsible for the oversight of USAFE’s WRM assets.  The 86 MMS primarily 
accomplishes its mission by collaborating with contractors and the host nation at 
each site.  The partnerships established at USAFE joint pre-position sites results 
in substantial cost-savings for USAFE, as zero personnel and zero aircraft are 
                                            
163 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 53. 
164 Rodney M. Mason, “United States Air Force Maritime Pre-positioning of War Reserve 
Material and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration,” (Master’s thesis, 
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permanently located at the JPS.165  The reliance on host nation personnel and 
contractors to perform the day-to-day support requirements for USAFE’s Pre-
positioned WRM results in a smaller overseas USAFE presence.  Figure 5 
depicts the two Norwegian airfields operating as USAFE joint pre-position sites. 
 
Figure 5.   USAFE Joint Pre-Position Sites (After Infoplease, 2011) 
It should be noted that not every JPS equates to a single airfield, unlike 
the other categories of installations discussed in this thesis.  DoD policy tasks the 
Services to “acquire and maintain, in peacetime, war materiel inventories 
sufficient to attain and sustain operational objectives.”166  Pre-positioned WRM 
may be located at airfields, ground-based storage facilities, seaports, or aboard 
ships afloat.  Additional JPS airfields should be established within the European 
                                            
165 Mason, “Maritime Pre-positioning of War Reserve Material,” 46. 
166 DOD Instruction 3110.06, “War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy,” June 23, 2008, 2. 
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AOR, but not as stand-alone JPS airfields.  The stockpiling of equipment function 
is easily merged at airfields operating as FOS, CSL or key nodes of the En Route 
Infrastructure (ERI).  Finding additional NATO members like Luxembourg and 
Norway willing to undertake the responsibilities of hosting a joint pre-position site 
promotes further collaboration within the Alliance. 
B. SANEM, LUXEMBOURG 
The U.S. Army turned over the storage complex in Sanem, Luxembourg to 
USAFE in 1994.167  Some reports have as much as 95 percent of USAFE’s 
WRM located at the storage depot in Sanem.  The collection of war reserve 
materiel located at Sanem has been valued at $400 million.168  The facility at 
Sanem is landlocked in Central Europe, requiring WRM taken from the Sanem 
warehouses to be trucked nearly two hours east to Ramstein.  Once at Ramstein, 
the WRM is then airlifted throughout the European AOR as required. 
Two concerns exist with the Sanem JPS.  First, a heavy reliance is placed 
on this facility if reports are true that 95-percent of USAFE’s WRM are located 
here.  Such a heavy concentration of WRM becomes vulnerable to interruptions 
of the transportation systems surrounding the storage complex.  If significant 
interruptions of the transportation systems do occur, the movement of critical 
WRM assets may be suspended or halted.  Therefore, the operations at the far 
end of the supply chain requiring the war reserve materiel are put at risk.  
Second, the movement of WRM at Sanem relies initially on ground-based 
transportation (trucks or trains). (Ramstein, a two-hour drive to the east, is the 
closest USAFE airfield.)  The closest seaports to Sanem lie on the North Sea,  
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approximately three hours by truck to the north.  The facility at Sanem does not 
offer “multimodal transport options” recommended for WRM joint Pre-position 
sites by a recent RAND study.169 
C. NORWAY 
In addition to the storage facility at Sanem, USAFE WRM is Pre-
positioned at two airfields in Norway, Sola Air Station near Stavanger and Bodo 
Air Station.170  Similar to the Sanem operation, day-to-day upkeep of the WRM 
Pre-positioned at Sola and Bodo is the responsibility of the host-nation and 
contractors.  Airmen of the 86 MMS based at Ramstein travel to the Norwegian 
airfields to conduct biannual inspections of the sites and to inventory the 
equipment.171  The value of the WRM Pre-positioned at the two Norwegian 
airfields was not identified.  Additional information pertaining to each Norwegian 
airfield is provided below. 
1. Sola Air Station (Stavanger), Norway 
Opened in 1937, Sola Air Station acts as both a military airfield—home to 
Royal Norwegian Air Force search and rescue helicopters—and a civilian airport 
servicing the local community.  In October 2003, NATO established the Joint 
Warfare Center in Stavanger.172  The co-located 426th Air Base Squadron (426 
ABS) provides support to U.S. military members assigned to NATO’s Joint 
Warfare Center and other USAF families located in Norway.  However, the 426 
ABS does not have any association with the WRM maintained at Sola. 
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2. Bodo Air Station, Norway 
Located within the Arctic Circle, Bodo Air Station is also shared by the 
Royal Norwegian Air Force and the local community as a civilian airport.  Both F-
16s, and search and rescue helicopters of the Royal Norwegian Air Force 
currently operate from the airfield.  Bodo first opened in 1921, but a runway was 
not constructed until 1941 (by German occupying forces).  Details of precisely 
what units and aircraft the U.S. Air Force operated from the air station over the 
years were difficult to come by.  It is believed both U-2 and F-104 aircraft 
operated from Bodo during the Cold War.173 
 The brief summary of Sola and Bodo air stations is outlined to emphasize 
the well-established and continuing partnership between the United States and 
Norway.  While the United States has not permanently stationed any aircraft 
within Norwegian territory, Norway has fulfilled NATO Alliance responsibilities by 
storing WRM for the United States for decades.  The stockpiles of WRM located 
at Sola and Bodo air stations provide USAFE vehicles and equipment in support 
of training exercises and the full spectrum of crises. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINT PRE-POSITION SITES 
Hosting joint pre-position sites to store WRM has allowed smaller NATO 
members to increase their contribution to the Alliance.  Both Luxembourg and 
Norway are founding members of NATO.  In addition, both nations are relatively 
small in terms of population and military strength in comparison to other NATO 
members like Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Their 
contribution as JPS hosts should not be understated, as every burden-sharing 
effort should be welcomed in the resource-constrained environment currently 
facing the United States and Europe.  As NATO membership expands, other 
countries in similar (diminutive) situations should be considered for similar 
contributions. 
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However, country size should not be the determining factor in establishing 
additional JPS across Europe.  War reserve materiel should be targeted for pre-
positioning sites that provide the greatest strategic advantage.  One 
consideration should definitely be the access to “multimodal transport options” as 
identified by the RAND study.  Close proximity to ground-based transportation 
networks, seaports, and airfields supplies logisticians with increased flexibility for 
moving WRM assets forward.  “Multimodal transport options” should carry 
significant weight in the decision to establish additional JPS in Europe.  Based on 
the current location of USAFE joint pre-position sites in Luxembourg and Norway, 





VI. EN ROUTE INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ideal airfield portfolio involves a network of sites that can rapidly 
adjust its infrastructure to support numerous missions  In this arrangement, an 
airfield categorized today as a forward-operating site can be easily transformed 
into a joint pre-position site or critical node of the en route infrastructure 
tomorrow.  Alternately, a main operating base hosting a tactical fighter wing can 
be converted into a forward-operating site for humanitarian airlift missions in 
support of the latest natural disaster.  Every USAFE airfield should be considered 
for infrastructure improvements that enhance its ability to support multi-functional 
operations, especially support to the Air Force’s en route system. 
The U.S. Air Force claims that one tool it brings to today’s fight is Global 
Reach.  Global Reach is defined as “the ability to project military capability 
responsively—with unrivaled velocity and precision—to any point on or above the 
earth, and provide mobility to rapidly supply, position, or reposition Joint 
forces.”174  Depending on the location of any particular crisis or contingency, 
access and utilization of any airfield could hold the key to the U.S. Air Force 
achieving Global Reach success.  Critical to maintaining this ability to project 
military power to any corner of the globe is the en-route infrastructure (ERI) 
maintained by the U.S. military services.  Many of the USAFE airfields previously 
categorized as a MOB or FOS are simultaneously principal actors for the U.S. Air 
Force in terms of its en route system.  As previously noted, Ramstein and 
Spangdahlem recently absorbed the throughput airlift capacity that once transited 
Rhein-Main Air Base.  The additional capability to support the USAF en route 
system at these two MOBs has been critical to the war efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
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Calder recognized ERI bases held the characteristics of being 
“strategically located,” “enduring,” and serving as “anchor points for 
throughput.”175  Outside of the MOBs and FOSs already covered in this thesis, 
one USAFE airfield meets this criteria: Lajes Field, Portugal.  Figure 6 notes 
Lajes Field is located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
Figure 6.   USAFE En Route Infrastructure (After Infoplease, 2011) 
B. LAJES FIELD, PORTUGAL 
The Azores is a collection of nine small islands located in the middle of the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Over 2,000 miles east of New York City and nearly 900 miles 
west of Lisbon, Portugal, the Azores have proven to be a critical stopover for 
ships and airplanes crossing the Atlantic for centuries.  Following the 1928 crash 
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of a Polish aircraft, the Portuguese government decided to construct an airfield 
on one of the islands.  Several landing strips of packed earth were eventually 
constructed during the 1930s.  One of these early landing strips was constructed 
on the island of Terceira, and it is known today as Air Base 4 or Lajes Field.176 
 Lajes Field proved to be a strategically important location for British and 
American aircraft maneuvering across the Atlantic during World War II. During 
the latter stages of the war, the U.S. Army sent an Engineer Regiment and 
Engineer Battalion to Lajes to construct an air base.  Throughput of aircraft 
skyrocketed after the completion of the air base, and the utilization of Lajes Field 
cut the flying time between the CONUS and North Africa nearly in half—from 
seventy to forty hours.177  While Lajes Field was transferred back to Portuguese 
control following the end of World War II, the U.S. presence at the airfield has 
remained constant ever since. 
 Throughout the sixty-four–year history of the U.S. Air Force, Lajes Field 
has played a significant role in nearly every major operation undertaken.  From 
the Berlin Airlift to Operation Unified Protector, Lajes Field has serviced 
thousands of aircraft going to and coming from the fight.  Its infrastructure 
through the years has gradually expanded.  Today, the airfield at Lajes includes 
a large runway measuring nearly 11,000 feet by 300 feet wide, and a massive 
aircraft parking apron. 
The 65th Air Base Wing (65 ABW) is the latest designation of the host unit 
at Lajes.  The airfield involves a U.S. investment similar in size to Incirlik, a 
forward-operating site, and the smaller main operating bases at Mildenhall and 
Aviano.  The PRV calculated for Lajes is nearly $1.2 billion.  While no USAF 
aircraft are permanently assigned to the 65 ABW, the installation boasts a U.S. 
population of 1,336 employees178 (see Table 4). 
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The United States has paid for a vast majority of the infrastructure 
expansions at Lajes over the years.  However, earlier in 2011 the entire runway 
at Lajes was re-surfaced for $7.045 million.  The Portuguese government 
contributed $1.26 million to this project, “the first ever cost-share project” in Lajes’ 
history.179  On the other hand, the United States pays significant amounts for 
continued access at this critically important strategic location.  Calder notes, 
“Portugal also long provided extensive base-related community support in the 
Azores, facilitated by substantial American economic assistance in return for 
access to the strategically important Lajes Air Base.”180  The United States 
Agency for International Development estimates the total economic and military 
assistance provided to Portugal from 1962 to 2009 was nearly $2.9 billion.181  
Deciphering exactly what percentage of this amount was intended as payment 
for access to Lajes Field is impossible to determine.  Nevertheless, Lajes will 
remain a stronghold of the USAF En Route Infrastructure despite these 
substantial costs and lack of burden sharing by the host nation.  Zero alternatives 

















1.2 65 ABW 1,336 NONE 
 
Table 4.   USAFE En Route Infrastructure 
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C. OTHER ERI AIRFIELDS 
Two airfields operated by the U.S. Navy, Naval Station Rota and Naval Air 
Station Sigonella are worth mentioning as part of the En Route Infrastructure 
within Europe.  These airfields do not qualify as members of the USAFE portfolio 
since the primary U.S. presence is not Air Force.  However, both airfields 
contribute immensely as “anchor points for throughput.” 
1. Naval Station Rota, Spain 
Strategically placed within fifty miles of the Straits of Gibraltar, Naval 
Station Rota consists of port facilities capable of supporting a variety of ships and 
submarines, and a large airfield.  The airfield includes a runway measuring 
12,000 feet long by 200 feet wide, and parking aprons and fuel hydrants recently 
constructed to support large cargo planes.182  The port facilities and airfield at 
Rota are shared by the Spanish and U.S. navies.  Additionally, Rota is home to 
the 725th Air Mobility Squadron (725 AMS) that is tasked with providing “en route 
maintenance, launch and recovery, and command and control for all of Air 
Mobility Command’s strategic, theater, and contract commercial aircraft transiting 
Naval Station Rota.”183  During the past decade, Rota has become a mobility hub 
for cargo planes traveling between the United States and the Central Command 
AOR.  At one point during the build up to the Iraq War, Air Force officials 
estimate “a quarter of all planes carrying cargo to the Middle East stopped at 
Naval Station Rota and Moron Air Base”184 (Moron is located seventy-five miles 
northeast of Rota). 
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2. Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy 
Located in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, Naval Air Station 
Sigonella is nicknamed “the Hub of the Med” due to its long history of 
maintenance and operational support to naval aircraft and ships on patrol in the 
area.  Similar to Rota’s transition to a mobility hub, Sigonella is a second naval 
airfield “undergoing a transformation” from a maritime patrol airfield to a multi-role 
mobility hub, linking the United States and Europe to Central Command and 
Africa Command’s AORs.185  A small detachment of 725 AMS personnel is 
permanently assigned to Sigonella to provide key mission support functions to 
cargo planes utilizing the airfield.  Over the past decade, Sigonella has 
experienced a major increase in USAF aircraft transiting the installation due to 
the continuing U.S. military commitments in Central Command’s AOR. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAFE EN ROUTE INFRASTRUCTURE 
The two naval airfields discussed in this chapter do not qualify as 
members of USAFE’s airfield portfolio.  Yet, defining their large role in the en 
route infrastructure utilized by USAF aircraft assists in outlining the continuing 
need for the DoD to look for partnering opportunities within the joint community.  
This is especially important with airfield infrastructure, which is extremely 
expensive to build and maintain.  Many of USAFE’s airfields discussed in 
previous chapters support the en route system in addition to other capabilities 
that they provide.  This multi-mission capability at numerous airfields provides air 
mobility planners tremendous flexibility.  Opportunities to expand the 
infrastructure at other airfields to increase the flexibility of the en route system 
even further should always be welcomed.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Lajes Field is irreplaceable! 
 
  
                                            
185 “Naval Air Station Sigonella,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified July 05, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sigonella.htm. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Before this chapter can turn to recommendations specific to the European 
theater and USAFE’s portfolio of airfields, it is important to emphasize the need 
for systemic analysis of military airfields and installations around the world.  In 
the Leasehold Empire, Sandars details the local, state, and regional negotiations 
practiced by the United States in securing basing rights and access.  However, 
rarely are the comprehensive effects to the entire global network of U.S. military 
installations understood when one airfield, base, or installation is closed or 
modified. 
In 1990, Blaker noted much of the “basing redundancy has been trimmed 
from the system.”186  Because of the lack of redundancy within the basing 
system, an interrelated character exists among the different sites.  For over a 
decade, the USAFE airfield portfolio has proven this interrelated character 
extends beyond the boundaries of any one particular theater.  As Calder 
commented, “The U.S. military moved more troops and equipment in the first 
three weeks of the Gulf War than it did in the first three months of the Korean 
War.”187  Nearly every airfield within USAFE’s portfolio participated in the 
movement of aircraft, personnel, and equipment to Central Command’s AOR 
during the past decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Without the 
USAFE airfield portfolio, conducting operations in Southwest Asia would be far 
more expensive and immeasurably slower. 
Two decades after Blaker’s identification regarding the loss of redundancy 
within the overseas basing structure of the U.S. military, additional capacity has 
been trimmed, especially within Europe.  Recall Admiral Stavridis, current 
Commander of U.S. European Command, testified that approximately 75 percent 
of the United States’ forward military presence in Europe has been cut since the 
end of the Cold War.  Troop levels have been reduced from 400,000 to 80,000, 
                                            
186 Blaker, An Anatomy of the Dilemma, 129. 
187 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 236. 
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and just twelve main operating bases and many smaller installations remain from 
the 1,200 military installations of the Cold War era.  USAFE’s share of the current 
force structure within Europe includes nearly 32,000 military and civilian 
personnel,188 five main operating bases, and many other geographically 
separated sites and locations.  Following Blaker’s logic, less redundancy equates 
to greater interdependence.  This is especially true of military airfields around the 
globe due to the extended range of multiple aircraft currently employed by the 
USAF.  This model particularly applies to USAFE’s holdings amid changing 
strategic focus and pending budget cuts. 
A. SUMMARY OF USAFE’S PORTFOLIO OF AIRFIELDS 
USAFE’s existing airfield portfolio includes five main operating bases, 
three forward-operating sites, six cooperative-security locations, two joint pre-
position sites, and one en route infrastructure airfield—seventeen airfields spread 
across the territory of ten nations.  Not included in this count is the large storage 
facility in Sanem, Luxembourg, that acts as a key joint pre-position site for 
USAFE.  The Sanem facility is not an airfield, and it is not collocated with an 
airfield.  Airfields operated by the U.S. Navy at Rota, Spain and Sigonella, Italy 
are also not included in this count.  While both airfields support USAF aircraft and 
operations, the facilities and infrastructure maintained at these locations fall 
under the purview of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, not USAFE.  See Figure 7 
for a display of the seventeen airfields included in USAFE’s portfolio. 
USAFE’s seventeen airfields are primarily the remnants of much larger, 
more dispersed airfield networks established during either World War II or the 
early stages of the Cold War.  Over the decades, U.S. national strategy has been 
periodically redefined, military technology has advanced, and the European 
security environment has evolved.  Today, the vast majority of the European 
AOR rests peacefully, stable and secure.  While many endorse additional U.S. 
                                            
188 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), 2010 
Base Structure Report.  Total personnel at all identified USAFE airfields (not including Papa 
Airfield, Hungary) was calculated at nearly 32,000 employees. 
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military reductions in Europe due to the enduring stability and security, this thesis 
encourages an expansion in Europe in terms of USAFE airfields. 
The twenty-first–century USAFE airfield expansion must differ significantly 
from past military airfield development in Europe.  Past expansions resulted in 
movements to defend Western Europe.  Today, no imminent security threat is 
looming within the continent.  To broaden the peace, security, and stability 
enjoyed across Europe today, the twenty-first–century airfield expansion must 
understand a fight-in-place U.S. force is not required.  Such an expansion must 
be centered on building partnerships and capitalizing on existing alliances in 
order to extend the peace, security, and stability in Europe to its periphery and 
beyond.  
 
Figure 7.   USAFE Portfolio of Airfields (After Infoplease, 2011) 
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B. NEED FOR SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY AIRFIELDS AND 
INSTALLATIONS 
This thesis is simply the tip of the iceberg when it comes to research and 
analysis required of the U.S. network of overseas military airfields.  Studies 
centered on the permission costs and operating costs associated with military 
airfields are highly recommended.  Such a study will enable U.S. military leaders 
at all levels greater understanding of resources required to acquire differing 
levels of airfield capacity and capability.  Additionally, future studies of the U.S. 
military airfields and installations overseas are encouraged to approach each 
project with a systemic point of view.  As Blaker stated, “U.S. overseas basing is 
best understood as a global system.”189  And Calder commented, “The system 
as a whole is global.”190  Studies involving one, two, or dozens of military airfields 
must consider the global implications within their analysis. 
This research project is an example of the kind of examination due for the 
entire network of U.S. military airfields around the world. Additional regional 
studies centered on North America, South America, Africa, Southwest Asia, 
Northeast Asia, the Pacific, and Australia are all required for the United States to 
reevaluate its entire forward military presence (overseas) in light of changing 
strategic priorities.  Furthermore, studies of the global airfield networks 
maintained by U.S. sister services and close allies should also be undertaken to 
help piece together this worldwide airfield puzzle.  As each regional piece is filled 
in, DoD will be better able to determine where overlapping capabilities and 
airfield capacity might be conducive to consolidation and divestment of 
infrastructure and which areas require an increased presence or greater airfield 
redundancy, demanding additional airfields to be established. 
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C. NATO EXPANSION = USAFE SHIFT TO THE EAST 
“NATO’s ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It 
is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and 
free, united in peace, democracy and common values.”191  This statement 
highlights one of the conclusions assumed following a 1995 study on NATO 
enlargement.  The post–Cold-War era has meant expansion and enlargement for 
NATO.  Twelve new countries have joined the Alliance: Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland in 1999; Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia in 2004; and Albania and Croatia in 2009.  The future promises 
increased membership for NATO as Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Georgia, and Ukraine are all aspiring members.  Figure 8 reflects 
the eastern expansion of NATO as ex-Warsaw Pact nations have joined 
allegiances with the democracies of Western Europe, Canada, and the United 
States. 
                                            




Figure 8.   Post-Cold War NATO Members (After Infoplease, 2011) 
Just one of the seventeen airfields in USAFE’s current portfolio resides in 
the territory of a new NATO ally, Papa Airfield in Hungary.  Recent reports, 
operations, and training exercises indicate USAFE is working with the new NATO 
allies of Eastern Europe.  Bases and airfields in Bulgaria and Romania were 
utilized during the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq.192  More recently, 
Exercise Dacian Thunder held in August 2011 involved airmen and A-10s from 
Spangdahlem.  U.S. airmen and aircraft deployed to Romania to work with 
Romanian airmen, and MiG-21s and IAR 330 helicopters.193  In October 2011, 
Operation Thracian Fall provided an off-station training opportunity for U.S. 
                                            
192 “US European Command Facilities,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified July 05, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/eucom.htm. 
193 Stephani Hunter, “Joint training builds NATO partnership,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe, last 
modified August 04, 2011, http://www.usafe.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123266445. 
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airmen from Ramstein.  Staging from and flying C-130J aircraft in Bulgaria 
enabled the U.S. airmen to improve interoperability with Bulgarian air and ground 
forces.194 
However, only one report has indicated the establishment of a new 
permanent USAFE presence at an airfield in Eastern Europe.  On June 13, 2011, 
the United States and Poland signed an agreement that will place U.S. airmen, 
F-16 fighters, and C-130 transport aircraft on Polish soil.  The U.S. presence will 
initially occur through rotational deployments in 2013, and it is expected to 
transition to a permanent U.S. presence by 2018.  As of the publication of this 
report, the total numbers of U.S. personnel and aircraft involved have not been 
announced. 
The 2011 agreement to establish a permanent USAFE presence in Poland 
signifies an important shift, a shift that appears to coincide with NATO’s 
expansion to the east.  The current global security environment, where the center 
of gravity for U.S. military operations remains Central Command’s AOR, 
strategically invites the expansion of the USAFE portfolio of airfields to the east.  
Many airfield locations within this territorial band of new NATO allies are 
hundreds to thousands of miles closer to such potential hot spots as the Middle 
East and Iran.  Additionally, expanding USAFE’s airfield portfolio into Eastern 
Europe enables the command to re-develop some valuable redundancy that was 
lost with the numerous airfield and installation closures of the past twenty years.  
The challenge will be to expand the USAFE portfolio of airfields while 
simultaneously reducing the overall costs. 
D. MORE AIRFIELDS = MORE OPPORTUNITIES 
Chapter II provided an in-depth analysis of the five main operating bases 
of USAFE’s airfield portfolio.  It begins by noting that the MOBs at Ramstein, 
Spangdahlem, Lakenheath, Mildenhall, and Aviano comprise 86 percent of 
                                            
194 “C-130Js take flight in mountains of Bulgaria in OTF11,” U.S. Air Forces Europe, last 
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USAFE’s nearly 32,000 military and civilian personnel.195  Also, the five MOBs 
host 99 percent of the 215 aircraft assigned to USAFE.  This heavy concentration 
of forces at USAFE’s five main operating bases comes at an average 
infrastructure cost (PRV) of $2.1 billion, with an average workforce of 5,500 
employees.  In comparison, the average infrastructure cost at the nine airfields 
categorized as forward-operating sites, cooperative-security locations (excluding 
Papa Airfield, Hungary for which data was not available), and en route 
infrastructure is $0.48 billion—less than a quarter of the average invested at a 
MOB.  Additionally, these same nine airfields are operated with a combined 
military and civilian workforce of 4,345 personnel, more than 1,000 fewer people 
than the average personnel employed at one MOB. 
This thesis assumes no strategic requirement exists for maintaining the 
three fighter wings at Lakenheath, Spangdahlem, and Aviano.  The fight-in-place 
force requirement of the Cold War is no more.  Additionally, many NATO allies 
maintain robust advanced fighter forces of their own.  Thus, serious 
consideration should be given to the redeployment of these three fighter wings to 
airfields within the CONUS.  If adopted, the infrastructure in place at these three 
main operating bases can be transformed to support USAFE strategic 
requirements as a FOS, CSL, JPS or ERI airfield.  The four different lower-level 
installations all operate with significantly reduced infrastructure and manpower 
investments in contrast to USAFE’s main operating bases.  They represent the 
“lighter” installations for which Calder argued.196 
Savings produced by the divestment of infrastructure at the three fighter 
MOBs will enable USAFE to shift operations and build (missing) redundancy at 
airfields in Eastern Europe.  More and “lighter” airfields across Europe will 
present USAFE with increased opportunities for building partnership capacity and 
enhancing new NATO relationships. 
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196 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 33. 
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E. DEVELOP TRUE PARTNERSHIPS 
The traditional USAF approach to the establishment of overseas airfields 
included the development of expensive family support infrastructures.  Little 
reliance was placed on the host nation to provide housing, medical, educational 
or recreational support to assigned airmen and their families.  The recently 
established Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Airfield, Hungary offers USAFE a new 
organizational model, where only minimal U.S.-only infrastructure has been 
constructed.  Airmen and families assigned to Papa Airfield will be expected to 
rely heavily on the local Hungarian communities for family support activities.  The 
effectiveness of the Heavy Airlift Wing’s lean support structure should be 
thoroughly evaluated.  If successful, implementation of this lean, “lighter” 
structure should be employed at existing USAFE airfields and future airfields that 
may be established in Eastern Europe. 
The specialized unit cooperative-security location, represented by the four 
MUNSS in place at NATO fighter wings, presents a second model that USAFE 
should consider employing at airfields across Europe.  The MUNSS model is 
associated with the highly specialized operations involving non-strategic nuclear 
weapons.  However, the concept of the specialized unit CSL can flex in support 
of the needs of the host nation.  USAFE maintenance personnel could be 
assigned to Poland to assist with the maintenance of Polish F-16s.  Security 
forces personnel could be assigned to an airfield in Albania in an effort to build 
the partnership capacity of this new NATO ally.  Dozens of other examples of 
numerous Air Force specialties could be presented here as opportunities for 
USAFE to expand its partnership capacity building program. 
John C. Maxwell, author of numerous books on leadership and 
management, skillfully defined the difference between cooperation and 
collaboration.  In The 17 Essential Qualities of a Team Player, Maxwell writes: 
“Cooperation is merely working together agreeably, but collaborating means 
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working together more aggressively.”197  For the most part, the U.S. military has 
been cooperating with military allies around the world. 
The demanding twenty-first-century security environment and challenging 
budget situation will require the United States to start collaborating with allies.  
Calder points out installations operating under the framework of a bilateral or 
multilateral alliance are regarded with greater legitimacy.198  Thus, the United 
States should push these alliance frameworks to the forefront.  USAFE must 
drive other NATO allies toward true partnerships where collaboration is required 
and an increased sharing of security responsibilities persists at every installation 
and every airfield.  When NATO partnerships are fully developed and 
collaboration is completely realized, USAFE’s airfield portfolio will consist of 
numerous integrated flying wings similar to those currently found at 
Geilenkirchen and Papa Airfield. 
Increased collaboration is required with USAFE’s sister services as well.  
Airfields operated by NAVEUR and USAREUR need to be evaluated for their 
individual capability and capacity to support USAFE operations.  As discussed in 
Chapter VI, the naval airfields at Rota and Sigonella currently provide substantial 
support to the U.S. Air Force en route infrastructure.  A third NAVEUR airfield is 
located at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete.  
USAREUR operates seven smaller airfields primarily for helicopter operations.  
All seven of USAREUR’s airfields are located in Germany.  These ten airfields 
operated by NAVEUR and USAREUR likely offer USAFE opportunities to 
establish additional lower-level infrastructure (JPS or ERI) capabilities without 
requiring a large financial investment. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
“A smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places 
and be able to do fewer things,”199  according to then-Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates final testimony to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee on 
June 15, 2011.  Secretary Gates retired on June 30, 2011, but not before he 
warned of the potential impacts the $400 billion in cuts proposed by President 
Obama over the next twelve years might have on the U.S. military if the 
reductions are not managed effectively.  With the failure of the Joint Committee 
on Deficit Reduction, the “super committee,” in November 2011, the Department 
of Defense potentially faces reductions of $968 billion over the next ten years 
(2012–2021).200  Before the super committee’s failure, current Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta warned the automatic sequestration cuts triggered by the super 
committee’s failure would result “in hollowing out the force.”201  A hollow force 
typically characterized by “fewer personnel and weapons systems, slowed 
military modernization, reduced readiness for operations, and continued stress 
on the all-volunteer force.”202 
Smaller military, fewer personnel, fewer weapons systems, going fewer 
places and doing fewer things!  Are these the only alternatives the U.S. military 
has while facing significantly reduced budgets over the next ten years?  This 
thesis proposes an alternative approach that enables a smaller force to go to 
more places and do more things.  Pressures to reduce the U.S. military’s 
overseas basing structure will mount as additional budget cuts loom.  Officials 
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must fight the urge to slash airfields and installations considered excess.  As 
Blaker warned, “Once dismantled, rebuilding an overseas basing system would 
not be easy, cheap, or quickly done.”203  More and “lighter” airfields will enable 
USAFE to expand its presence into Eastern Europe, and build collaborative 
relationships with joint and European partners across the region. 
Despite the shrinking budgets, this thesis proposes expanding USAFE’s 
portfolio of airfields.  This proposal is not suggesting that additional aircraft and 
personnel be sent to Europe.  In fact, the twenty-first–century USAFE airfield 
expansion can be accomplished with fewer aircraft and fewer personnel, as long 
as both are chosen with an eye toward flexibility and interoperability.   
USAFE must first reduce its heavy footprint at its five main operating 
bases.  In addition to removing the three permanent fighter wings from Europe, 
USAFE must leverage the capabilities of the respective host nations (Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom) of these installations to provide many of the 
support services currently performed by U.S. airmen.  Moreover, USAFE should 
follow NATO’s enlargement into Eastern Europe, making the most of these 
states’ readiness, willingness, and ability to support U.S. requirements in airfields 
and other basing needs.  To be sure, this eastern expansion must be done 
without the large investment in support infrastructure, which was typical of airfield 
development in earlier decades.  New challenges and new priorities require new 
approaches, even—or especially—to significant installations like airfields.  
Greater reliance on old and new NATO allies will enable a smaller USAFE force 
to go to more places.  Ultimately, more airfields will lead to more opportunities to 
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